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Abstract 
 
During the nineteenth century, several Western powers began to establish a presence in East Asia 
through the use of gunboat diplomacy.  In 1853, United States Commodore Matthew C. Perry 
arrived on Japanese shores intent on forcing the ruling Tokugawa Shogunate to end its policy of 
sakoku (seclusion) and interact with the West through trade.  Angered over the policies of the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, the han (domains) of Chōshū and Satsuma decided to launch the Boshin 
Civil War by instigating rebellion against the shogun.  The military forces of Chōshū and 
Satsuma eventually captured the imperial capital of Kyoto and the young Prince Mutsuhito in 
1867.  The following year, Prince Mutsuhito ascended to the imperial throne and took the 
posthumous title of Emperor Meiji, and announced that imperial rule had returned to the country.  
The leadership of Chōshū and Satsuma decided to learn from the West and adopted several 
components of Western civilization in order to strengthen the country by fundamentally 
transforming its economics, politics, and society.  During the 1880s, that leadership was crippled 
in a debate over constitutionalism, and the role with which the Emperor was to have in the new 
political order.  Those leaders who favored imperial over popular sovereignty eventually 
prevailed in the debate resulting in the creation of a political structure that preserved imperial 
sovereignty.  In 1890, the Empire of Japan was officially recognized throughout the West when 
it adopted its own constitution.  While great progress had been achieved during the reign of 
Emperor Meiji, the high-water mark for the development of party politics occurred during the 
reign of Emperor Taishō.  Unlike his predecessor’s, the early reign of Emperor Shōwa was 
marked with acts of political terrorism and international upheavals which threatened to uproot 
the Meiji political structure.  As a result of this, mainstream politicians turned to the Imperial 
Japanese military and radical bureaucrats to enact reforms that would preserve the political 
system in the face of such turbulence. 
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Introduction 
 
 Similar to the experience of many European nation-states during the Interwar period, the 
Empire of Japan witnessed a brief period of rule under a parliamentary regime.  This period of 
Japanese history is often referred to as “Taishō Democracy,” and is coupled with the rise of 
political party prime ministers as well as the development of political intellectualism.  It was 
followed by a chaotic and violent Shōwa period, during which Japan became a highly militarized 
society and joined other Fascist nation-states to fight against the West.  Several historians have 
challenged whether or not it is proper to label the Empire of Japan a fascist state during the early 
Shōwa period.
1
  A basic understanding of fascist ideology and its application to Japan from 1931 
– 1941 will demonstrate that Japan was indeed fascist.
2
  Further examination of Japanese history 
from 1868 – 1941 will show that the path that Japan and its political leaders had undertaken prior 
to the Shōwa period greatly aided the rise of fascism in Japan. 
 By the time that United States Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived on Japanese shores 
in 1853, the Tokugawa shogunate was over 250 years old.  It was established in 1603 after its 
founder Tokugawa Ieyasu had won the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600.  In 1543, the Portuguese 
were the first Europeans to reach the Japanese islands, and throughout the seventeenth century, 
three other European nations joined the Portuguese and made contact with Japan.  In order to 
stem the increasing presence of Westerners on its shores, the Tokugawa shogunate decided to 
institute a policy of sakoku, or seclusion.  Having witnessed gunboat diplomacy firsthand during 
the Anglo-Chinese Opium Wars of 1839 – 42 and 1856 – 60, the Tokugawa shogunate was quick 
                                                          
1See Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto, “Fascism and the History of Pre-War Japan: The Failure of a Concept,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 39, No. 1 (Nov. 1979): 66 – 76 and George M. Wilson, “A New Look at the Problem of 
“Japanese Fascism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 10, No. 4 (July 1968): 401 – 412. 
 
2Three tenets will be stressed: (1) ultra-nationalism, (2) a cult of personality, and (3) an aggressive foreign policy. 
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to end sakoku and signed a series of “Unequal Treaties” with several Western powers.  Then, at 
the end of 1867, a triumvirate of han, or feudal domains, which included Chōshū, Satsuma, and 
Tosa, decided to support the young Emperor Meiji (1852 – 1912) over the shogun.  The Meiji 
Revolution was orchestrated and carried out by samurai, who overthrew the centuries old 
Tokugawa shogunate.  The samurai that led the Meiji Revolution then became the leaders of the 
new regime, and for the next twenty years these samurai ruled Japan as an oligarchy. 
 During the late 1870s, the Meiji oligarchy was put into a state of shock when two 
influential oligarchs, Itagaki Taisuke (1837 – 1919) and Saigō Takamori (1828 – 77), left the 
oligarchy over a variety of issues.  Saigō returned to his native province of Satsuma where he led 
thousands of samurai in what became known as the Satsuma Rebellion.  The Meiji oligarchs 
eventually defeated Saigō in late 1877.  Rather than take up arms against the Meiji oligarchs, 
Itagaki Taisuke decided to create a populist movement.  Known as the Jiyū Minken Undō 
(Freedom and People’s Rights Movement), it was the first populist movement in Japan.  
Supported primarily by shizoku, or former samurai, the Jiyū Minken Undō vouched for limited 
suffrage and the need for a national assembly within the new Japanese political system.  With the 
Satsuma Rebellion crushed, and the Jiyū Minken Undō too weak to offer any serious opposition, 
the oligarchs began to implement several important developments that transformed Japan into the 
first ever non-Western imperial power.  The first of the major developments included 
modernization.  Modernization was implemented in order to fundamentally transform Japan’s 
economics, politics, and society.  The second major development involved political infighting 
between two Meiji oligarchs, Itō Hirobumi (1841 – 1909) and Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838 – 1922).  
The primary issue between the two oligarchs was over which constitutional model (either British 
or German) Japan should adopt.  The ousting of Ōkuma Shigenobu from office in 1881 ended 
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the debate over constitutionalism, resulting in the adoption of the German constitutional model.  
Since Ōkuma Shigenobu was not from either Chōshū or Satsuma, the Meiji oligarchs from those 
two provinces were able to form a tighter political alliance that became known as the Sat-chō 
Clique.  The third and final major development involved the actual establishment of the new 
political system. 
 On 11 February 1889, the Empire of Japan was formally established with the release of 
the Meiji Constitution.  Shortly after the release of the constitution, a new rank – that of genrō, 
or Elder Statesmen – was created in order to reward oligarchs with a position that would enable 
them to advise as well as oversee the operation of the new state.
3
  In 1889, there were only two 
genrō: Itō Hirobumi, who was the author of the Meiji Constitution, and Yamagata Aritomo (1838 
– 1922), who was the father of the modern Imperial Japanese Army.  In time, the number of 
genrō gradually increased.  The first prime ministers belonged solely to this small ruling elite.  In 
1900, Itō Hirobumi decided to broaden and expand his political base and created the Rikken 
Seiyūkai (Constitutional Association of Political Friends).
4
  The creation of the Seiyūkai marked 
a significant break between Itō and the other oligarchs.  Since the adoption of the German 
constitutional model, the oligarchs had been united through a concept known as chōzen naikaku, 
or non-party cabinets (also known as transcendentalism).  Chōzen naikaku was designed and 
implemented in order to prevent the appointment of prime ministers who were affiliated with 
political parties, and to keep the position of prime minister firmly in the hands of the Sat-chō 
                                                          
3Throughout this thesis I interchange between genrō and the Sat-chō Clique.  The two appellations essentially refer 
to the same small group of men who were the ruling elite for much of pre-war Japan. 
 
4All Japanese political parties will be italicized and introduced with their long names.  Shortened versions of those 
names will be utilized afterwards. 
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Clique.  By creating his own power base, Itō was essentially removing himself from his fellow 
genrō in the Sat-chō Clique. 
 While significant progress was made during the reign of Meiji, the definitive period for 
the development of party politics in Japan occurred during the reign of the Taishō emperor (1912 
– 1926).  On 30 July 1912, Emperor Meiji died, and his successor Taishō (1879 – 1926) became 
emperor of Japan.  Soon after Emperor Taishō succeeded to the Imperial Throne, Katsura Tarō 
(1848 – 1913) became prime minister for a third time.  As a member of the Sat-chō Clique, and a 
protégé of Yamagata Aritomo, Katsura Tarō had the unequivocal support of the army.  Due to 
this unabashed support, the navy decided to not supply a minister to Katsura’s third cabinet, 
paralyzing the administration.  In order to resolve this Taishō political crisis, Prime Minister 
Katsura decided to take direct action and appealed to Emperor Taishō for assistance.  Viewing 
this as a blatant violation of the Meiji Constitution, the mainstream political parties banded 
together to form the “Movement to Protect the Constitution.”  Large scale riots initiated by the 
movement subsided only when Katsura resigned from office and the genrō declared that a new 
cabinet was in the process of forming.  In 1913, Katsura decided to establish the Rikken Dōshikai 
(Constitutional Association of Friends).  Like the Seiyūkai for Itō, the Dōshikai was meant to be 
a source of political power for Katsura. 
 The opening of hostilities between the major European powers in 1914 resulted in the 
First World War, and bound by its 1902 alliance with Great Britain, the Empire of Japan entered 
on the side of the Allies.  During the war, Japan seized all of Germany’s territory in East Asia 
and the Pacific.  In 1918, the major world powers met in order to negotiate an end to hostilities 
and bring about peace.  As one of those major powers, Japan was a cosigner of the Treaty of 
Versailles and became one of the founding members of the League of Nations.  In addition to 
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this, a series of naval limitation treaties were signed between the Empire of Japan, Great Britain 
and the United States that granted Japan naval superiority in the Pacific, making it a regional 
power.  During the war, the Dōshikai had merged with other smaller political parties to form the 
Rikken Kenseikai (Constitutional Party) in 1917.  The death of Yamagata Aritomo in 1922 
greatly reduced the influence that the genrō had over governmental affairs.
5
  In that same year 
the Nihon Kyōsantō (Japanese Communist Party) had formed.
6
  In 1925, the Kenseikai president 
Katō Kōmei (1860 – 1926) had finally become prime minister and under his administration, Katō 
expanded suffrage to all males aged over 25 years old.  In addition to this piece of liberal 
legislation, the Katō administration passed a new Peace Preservation Law which seriously 
hindered the ability of the J.C.P. and other radical Leftists in their ability to expand and grow. 
 On 25 December 1926, Emperor Taishō died, and on that same day Prince Regent Shōwa 
succeeded to the Imperial Throne.  The practice of appointing political party prime ministers 
continued during the early years of Emperor Shōwa’s reign.  In addition to this, the Kenseikai 
had merged yet again with smaller political parties to form the Rikken Minseitō (Constitutional 
Democratic Party) in 1927.  Since the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894 – 95, nationalism had 
been growing exponentially in Japan.  By the time of Emperor Shōwa’s reign, nationalism in 
Japan had reached its zenith.  The establishment of secret ultranationalist societies like the 
Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society) and the Sakurakai (Cherry Blossom Society) helped to 
further expand nationalist sentiments since most of these societies stressed radical nationalism as 
a key part of their ideology.  At the outset of the 1930s, the Kwantung Army began to disregard 
the civilian government in Tokyo due to its non-expansionist stance on China.  Many of the 
                                                          
5Itō Hirobumi had been assassinated in 1909.  Katsura Tarō died of natural causes in 1913.  Only Matsukata 
Masayoshi (1835 – 1924) and Prince Saionji remained alive during the Taishō years. 
 
6Henceforth known as J.C.P. 
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officers of the Kwantung Army were in fact members of either the Black Dragon, or Cherry 
Blossom Society and as such became radical ultranationalists.  On 18 September 1931, officers 
from the Kwantung Army blew up a section of railway in Manchuria and blamed the incident on 
Chinese bandits.  During the next several days, the Kwantung Army invaded Manchuria from its 
bases in Korea and seized the region from Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China. 
 Following this Manchurian Incident was an attack orchestrated by ultranationalists on 
various economic and political leaders.  On 15 May 1932, Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855 
– 1932) and several other business and political leaders were targeted for assassination.  For 
political leaders like Prince Saionji Kinmochi (1849 – 1940) and Prince Konoe Fumimaro (1891 
– 1945) these attacks (collectively known as the Ketsumeidan Incident) were unsettling since 
they were a violent attempt to change the very nature of the economic and political order.   For 
several years ultranationalists consistently hounded the leaders of the mainstream political 
parties and carried out acts of political terrorism.  The Ketsumeidan Incident is often seen as the 
end of “Taishō Democracy”; for after Inukai’s assassination, the position of prime minister 
would never be held by a member of a political party.  The last surviving genrō, Prince Saionji 
Kinmochi, determined that only civilian bureaucrats (non-party affiliated) and military men 
would qualify to restore discipline and order to the deteriorating state that Japan found itself in 
during the 1930s. 
 The greatest act of political terrorism that was carried out by ultranationalists however, 
occurred on 26 February 1936 and is known as the Two Twenty-six Incident.  While initially 
successful in gaining control of the government district in Tokyo, the rebels were eventually 
crushed when the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy heeded the call of Emperor Shōwa to put 
down the coup.  Due to the failure of the Two Twenty-six Incident, radical ultranationalists 
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would never again attempt to alter the economic or political order through violence.  On 4 June 
1937, Prince Konoe Fumimaro was thrust into a position of greater political power when he was 
nominated to the position of prime minister by Prince Saionji.  Soon after taking office, Prince 
Konoe led the Empire of Japan into the Second Sino-Japanese War when Chinese and Japanese 
forces clashed over the Marco Polo Bridge in Beijing.  At the end of 1937, after weeks of bitter 
fighting with Guomindang forces, the Imperial Japanese Army took the Chinese capital of 
Nanjing.  Despite having seized the Chinese capital, the Guomindang leadership refused to 
negotiate with the Japanese, and the Chinese retreated westwards to Chongqing; ensuring that the 
conflict would continue. 
 While presiding over the position of prime minister for a second time in 1940, Prince 
Konoe began seeking out ways which would internally strengthen the Empire of Japan.  For 
Prince Konoe, the answer seemed to lie with Japan’s new alliance with Germany, that had been 
established between the two nations in 1936.  Prince Konoe decided to create the Tasei 
Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) on 12 October 1940.
7
  Having observed the 
strength of fascism in Europe, Prince Konoe sought to model the I.R.A.A. after the fascist parties 
found in both Germany and Italy.  The mainstream political parties, the Seiyūkai and Minseitō, 
once the great bastions of opposition to the ruling elite decided to dissolve and merge with the 
I.R.A.A. in order to show their patriotism and solidarity with the new nationalist organization. 
 The works utilized for the research aspect of this thesis fall under two distinct categories.  
The first category belongs to that of books, which are largely secondary works.  Three 
monographs were used extensively and need to be acknowledged: George Akita’s Foundations 
of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868 – 1900 and Peter Duus’ Party Rivalry and 
                                                          
7Henceforth known as I.R.A.A. 
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Political Change in Taishō Japan.  In addition to these two is Gordon M. Berger’s Parties Out of 
Power in Japan, 1931 – 1941.  Each of these monographs offer exceptional insight into the 
Japanese political system within the period that they cover.  The second category belongs to 
academic journal articles.  All of the journal articles used within this thesis concentrate on a 
particular theme within Japanese history.  The majority of the journal articles used deal with the 
late Taishō and early Shōwa.  One such example is Stephen S. Large’s “Nationalist Extremism in 
Early Shōwa Japan: Inoue Nisshō and the ‘Blood-Pledge Corps Incident’, 1932.” 
 The first monograph to be utilized in this thesis is George Akita’s Foundations of 
Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868 – 1900, which examines the creation of the 
Japanese political system.  Akita’s primary argument is centered on the idea that the Meiji 
oligarchs were neither benevolent nor domineering leaders, but a mix between the two.  After 
seizing power in 1868, the oligarchs wanted to hold onto that power and transform Japan into a 
powerful nation-state that would be able to protect itself from Western imperialism.  The Meiji 
oligarchs were turned into a smaller ruling elite known as the Sat-chō Clique when Ōkuma 
Shigenobu was ousted from office in 1881.  While half of Foundations of Constitutional 
Government is dedicated to the years of 1868 to 1881 and the formation of the Sat-chō Clique, 
the remainder of the work is devoted to the concept of chōzen naikaku or non-party cabinets.  For 
the members of the Sat-chō Clique, chōzen naikaku was a policy that was designed and 
implemented in order to protect their hold on power.  Towards the end of Foundations of 
Constitutional Government, Akita demonstrated how the thinking of Itō Hirobumi and Yamagata 
Aritomo changed in the early years of the twentieth century after having witnessed 
obstructionism in the lower House of Representatives by the mainstream political parties towards 
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their policies.  In 1900, Itō decided to create the Rikken Seiyūkai as a way to recruit members of 
the lower House of Representatives and to dominate that political institution. 
 The next monograph used is Peter Duus’ Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taishō 
Japan and deals specifically with the development of the mainstream political parties and their 
ascendancy during the Taishō years (1912 – 1926).  Duus’ primary argument in Party Rivalry 
and Political Change is that during the Taishō years, Japan and its political leaders came very 
close to accepting a greater role for political party members in the governance of the country.  
This was made possible due to the political ambitions of the smaller political parties in the lower 
House of Representatives, all of whom wanted to challenge the Seiyūkai.  In 1913, Katsura Tarō, 
a general of the Imperial Japanese Army and protégé of Yamagata Aritomo, helped create the 
Rikken Dōshikai.  While Katsura would die shortly after founding the Dōshikai, the Dōshikai 
would continue to play an important role in Japanese politics.  In 1916, the Dōshikai merged 
with smaller groups in the Imperial Diet for a second time to form the Rikken Kenseikai.  The 
ability of this political party to merge and form a new political party would be crucial for its 
continued survival.  The next significant development that Duus covered in Party Rivalry and 
Political Change is the resurgence of Seiyūkai dominance from1918 – 1921 while under the 
leadership of Hara Kei (1856 – 1921).  Both Akita and Duus attribute the creation of a successful 
political party to its association with a member of the Sat-chō Clique. 
 In Chapter 3 of this thesis, two political intellectuals are introduced.  The first is Yoshino 
Sakuzō (1878 – 1933), a widely respected academic who espoused democratic principals in his 
writing.  Two journal articles were used in order to acquire background information and further 
knowledge on Yoshino.  The first journal article used is “The Political Theory and Program of 
Yoshino Sakuzō,” and was written by Bernard S. Silberman.  Throughout the article, Silberman 
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utilizes several of Yoshino’s quotes, and then interprets them.  The second journal article to be 
used is “Envisioning a Liberal Empire in East Asia: Yoshino Sakuzō in Taishō Japan,” and was 
written by Jung-sun N. Han.  Unlike Silberman, who concentrated on Yoshino’s views on 
constitutionalism, Han describes Yoshino’s views on foreign policy and introduces the reader to 
several articles that deal specifically with Japanese expansionism.  Han concludes his work and 
stated that because of the importance with which Westerners place on democratic values, 
Yoshino’s views on constitutionalism overshadowed those on foreign policy.  The primary 
source material that was used for Yoshino Sakuzō came from Sources of Japanese Tradition, a 
collection of translated primary source material first published by Columbia University in the 
1950s. 
 The second individual that will be mentioned is Kita Ikki (1883 – 1937), who was an 
extremely controversial figure in Japanese history due to his radical political views.  Three 
secondary sources were used to acquire knowledge on Kita.  The first source was a book titled 
Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki, 1883 – 1937, by George M. Wilson.  In addition to this 
book, two journal articles were also used.  The first article was written by Wilson and is titled 
“Kita Ikki’s Theory of Revolution.”  The second article was written by Christopher W. A. 
Szpilman and is titled “Kita Ikki and the Politics of Coercion.”  In this article, Szpilman does 
mention Kita’s work as a political radical but largely depicts Kita as a political bully.  Primary 
source material on Kita Ikki came from Sources of Japanese Tradition. 
 The third and final monograph to be used is Gordon M. Berger’s Parties Out of Power in 
Japan, 1931 – 1941.  Berger’s primary goal with Parties Out of Power is to show the reader how 
the collapse of the mainstream political parties, the Seiyūkai and Minseitō occurred and in 
addition to this, to show how the I.R.A.A. was formed.  Within the first chapter of Parties Out of 
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Power, Berger details the history behind the mainstream political parties and their rise to power.  
Berger attributes the collapse of “Taishō Democracy” to the Minseitō Prime Minister Hamaguchi 
Osachi (1870 – 1931), who presided over that position from 1929 – 1931.  Political party 
members would continue to dominate the position of prime minister for an additional two years, 
until Inukai Tsuyoshi’s assassination in 1932.  What followed Inukai’s assassination was a five 
year period of “National Unity Cabinets” in which the military dominated the administrative 
aspects of the country.  The position of prime minister was returned to civilian hands when 
Prince Konoe Fumimaro was nominated to that position on 4 June 1937.  The remainder of 
Parties Out of Power is devoted to Prince Konoe and his attempt to establish a new political 
party (the I.R.A.A.) and its operation during the first few years of its existence.  
 After having undergone an examination of Japanese history from 1868 – 1941, the 
conclusion will return back to the original purpose of this thesis; and show why the Empire of 
Japan can and should still be labeled a fascist state.  Several key identifiers will be utilized from 
each of the sources used in order to support the claim that the Empire of Japan was a fascist state.  
If labeling the Empire of Japan a fascist state during the early Shōwa is wrong as some historians 
suggest, then perhaps it is time to look towards new political appellations for the Empire of 
Japan during this time period.
8
 
 
                                                          
8See Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto, “Fascism and the History of Pre-War Japan,” 71. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Oligarchic Years (1868 – 1890) 
 
 During the summer of 1864, samurai from the han (domain) of Chōshū attempted to seize 
the imperial capital of Kyoto and overthrow the Tokugawa Shogunate.  The attempted coup 
d’état failed, and with approval from Emperor Komei, Tokugawa Iemochi first banished and 
then invaded Chōshū.  For the next four years, the Tokugawa Shogunate found itself locked in 
internecine conflict with the defiant han.  During the course of this Boshin Civil War, an alliance 
was eventually brokered between the han of Chōshū and Satsuma.  Towards the end of 1867, this 
Sat-chō Alliance launched an invasion north and with their combined military strength seized the 
imperial capital of Kyoto from the Tokugawa Shogunate.  At the outset of 1868, the recently 
inaugurated Emperor Meiji (1852 – 1912) announced that an Ishin or Revolution had taken place 
and that imperial rule had been restored to Japan.  By the summer of 1869, all pockets of 
Tokugawa resistance had been liquidated and the Boshin Civil War was concluded.  In defeating 
the Tokugawa Shogunate and causing its collapse, the Sat-chō Alliance had removed the sole 
governing institution of Japan.  The majority of the men who took part in the Meiji Revolution 
were samurai and for the next twenty two years an elite group of these samurai ruled Japan as an 
oligarchy.  In order to strengthen Japan internally, these Meiji oligarchs decided to enact a 
nationwide modernization program that would fundamentally transform Japan’s economics, 
politics and society. 
 Following their victory over the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Meiji oligarchs began the 
process of dismantling the political system that had been set in place by the Tokugawa over two 
centuries ago.  Influential men like Kido Takayoshi (1833 – 77), Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830 – 78) 
and Saigō Takamori (1828 – 77) helped to stabilize the regime through their leadership 
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capabilities as they began to make rapid changes.
9
  In order to legitimize their seizure of power, 
the oligarchs placed Emperor Meiji as the focal point of their regime.  In the beginning of 1868, 
several Meiji oligarchs were appointed as Sangi (councilors) and advised the emperor on 
important matters of state.  On 7 April 1868, the oligarchs released the “Charter Oath.”  Of all 
documents released by the oligarchs, none have been so heavily commented on or critiqued by 
historians as the “Charter Oath.”  Its text stated concisely: 
By this oath, we set up as our aim the establishment of the national weal on a 
broad basis and the framing of a constitution and laws.  1.  Deliberative 
assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided by public 
discussion.  2.  All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the 
administration of affairs of state.  3.  The common people, no less than the civil 
and military officials, shall each be allowed to pursue his own calling so that there 
may be no discontent.  4.  Evil customs of the past shall be broken off and 
everything based upon the just laws of nature.  5.  Knowledge shall be sought 
throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule.
10
 
The message of the “Charter Oath” was clear and twofold.  The first three articles were written in 
such a way as to provide the Japanese people a sense of unity.  While the fourth article, perhaps 
the most important in the “Charter Oath,” paved the way for future reform since it attacked 
feudal tradition by labeling it as “evil customs of the past.” 
 On 6 June 1868, the oligarchs released the Seitaisho or Constitution of 1868.  This 
document reformed the original government that the oligarchs had established shortly after 
seizing power from the Tokugawa Shogunate.  After restating the “Charter Oath” the text of the 
Seitaisho stated: 
                                                          
9Each of these men had played a crucial part during the Boshin Civil War.  Kido and Ōkubo were political leaders 
from Chōshū; while Saigō was a military leader from Satsuma. 
 
10Cited in William Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck and Arthur E. Tiedemann, Sources of Japanese Tradition: 1600 to 
2000, Vol. 2, 2
nd
 Ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 672. 
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I.  All power and authority in the empire shall be vested in a Council of State, and 
thus grievances of divided government shall be done away with.  The power and 
authority of the Council of State shall be threefold, legislative, executive and 
judicial.  Thus the imbalance of authority among the different branches of 
government shall be avoided.  II.  The legislative organ shall not be permitted to 
perform executive functions.  However, on extraordinary occasions the legislative 
organ may still perform such functions as tours of inspections of cities and the 
conduct of foreign affairs.
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The main governing institution was called the Daijō-kan, or the Council of State, and was to be 
headed by a grand minister and two vice ministers.  In addition to this, departments of state – the 
number of which changed at various times – were established in order to better manage various 
aspects of the new Meiji state.  Most of the oligarchs who had been appointed as Sangi earlier in 
the regime retained their posts or were reassigned within the various departments of state. 
 The next major reform campaign undertaken by the oligarchs was against the daimyo 
(feudal lords) and their samurai retainers.  Under the feudal system, the daimyo and samurai had 
a well-established relationship.  Seeking warriors to protect their domains, the daimyo hired 
samurai by giving them a yearly stipend for their services.  Since the “Charter Oath” labeled 
feudal traditions as “evil customs of the past” it became necessary for the Meiji oligarchs to 
either reform or destroy such feudal traditions; and the relationship that had been built between 
the daimyo and samurai was one such feudal tradition that needed to be destroyed.  Towards the 
end of 1868, an Imperial Rescript was written by Kido Takayoshi which proposed to have the 
daimyo promoted to the rank of kazoku (nobility) and the samurai demoted to the rank of shizoku 
(gentry).  On 3 September 1868, the Daijō-kan moved the capital from Kyoto to Edo, which was 
then renamed Tokyo. 
 
Consolidation and Transformation 
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In order to be able to call upon all of Japan’s resources for their modernization program, 
the oligarchs began to consider the problem that the han posed to their rule.  Despite having 
enacted some social reforms in 1868, the daimyo still retained control over their han.  In addition 
to this, most daimyo had obtained the right to pass on their han to their heirs.  At first the 
oligarchs proposed to keep the daimyo in control of their han as appointed governors.  As 
appointed governors the daimyo would lose the right to pass on their han to their heirs.  On 29 
August 1871, the oligarchs released an Imperial Rescript which abolished the han: “Profoundly 
regretting this condition of affairs, We now completely abolish the Clans (han) and convert them 
into Prefectures (ken), with the object of diligently retrenching expenditure and of arriving at 
convenience of working, or getting rid of the unreality of names and of abolishing the disease of 
government proceeding from multiple centers.”
12
  Upon learning of these developments, one 
Western observer wrote how the abolition of the feudal han affected the Japanese: “The 
thunderbolt has fallen!  The political earthquake has shaken Japan to its center.  Its effects are 
very visible here in Fukui.  Intense excitement reigns in the homes of the samurai of the city 
today.”
13
  By replacing the han with a modern political unit, the oligarchs achieved two goals.  
The first goal was the final removal of the daimyo as a legitimate class in Japanese society, while 
the second goal was the centralization of all territories under Tokyo’s control. 
On 23 December 1871, a small group of Meiji oligarchs led by Prince Iwakura Tomomi 
(1825 – 83) left Japan in order to make visits to each of the major Western powers.  Named after 
its leader, the Iwakura Mission spent the next two years abroad.  The primary objective of the 
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mission was to revise the unequal treaties that the major Western powers had imposed on Japan 
at the end of the Tokugawa period.  Its secondary objective was to observe the West and learn as 
much about it as possible.  While in the West, the Japanese were impressed and wrote: 
Their trade is prosperous, their technology is superior, and they grealy enjoy the 
pleasures and comforts of life.  When one observes such conditions, one is apt to 
think that these countries have always been like this, but such is not the case – the 
wealth and prosperity one sees now in Europe dates to an appreciable degree from 
the period after 1800.  It has taken scarcely forty years to produce such 
conditions.  Those who read this record should reflect upon the lesson to be drawn 
for Japan.
14
 
As can be seen from the above quote, the Iwakura Mission had a profound impact on the Meiji 
oligarchs that went abroad.  While the oligarchs were impressed by the wealth and power of the 
West, the oligarchs were equally impressed with the technological capabilities of the West.  By 
visiting each of the major Western powers, the Iwakura Mission was able to obtain a vast array 
of information. 
 In the early 1870s, Yamagata Aritomo (1838 – 1922) rose to prominence and joined the 
ranks of the oligarchs as a major reformer.  Having served as a commander for Chōshū during 
the Boshin Civil War, Yamagata had extensive military experience and knowledge.  By the time 
that the Iwakura Mission had left for the West, Yamagata had already spent several years in 
France and Prussia.  Having observed the progress of the Prussian armed forces during the Three 
Wars of German Unification, Yamagata was impressed by their performance and was 
determined to model the Imperial Japanese Army on the German system.  Upon returning to 
Japan in 1873, Yamagata strongly advocated the need for a modern army.  On 10 January 1873, 
Yamagata convinced the Daijō-kan to pass a Conscription Ordinance which stipulated: “By this 
innovation the rulers and the ruled will be put on the same basis, the rights of the people will be 
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equal, and the way will be cleared for the unity of soldier and peasant.”
15
  By making the armed 
forces to recruit from all levels of society (not just from former samurai) the oligarchs had once 
again passed a piece of legislation that helped bring an end to a deeply rooted piece of feudal 
tradition. 
 Towards the middle of the 1870s, the Meiji oligarchs started to encounter sterner 
resistance towards their attempts at reform.  Things came to a head when Itagaki Taisuke (1837 – 
1919) and Saigō Takamori left the oligarchy and returned to their native domains of Tosa and 
Satsuma in early 1874.  The two men left the oligarchy over differences of opinion in regards to 
foreign affairs as well as the recent reforms levied against the former samurai class.  The actions 
undertaken by Itagaki and Saigō clearly suggested that both men had a desire to aid the former 
samurai class in maintaining some measure of prestige.  The oligarchs for their part feared that 
the actions of these two men would be seen as a catalyst for counter-revolution. 
 The establishment of liberalism in Japan is often credited to Itagaki Taisuke.  After 
returning to Tosa at the beginning of 1874, Itagaki and his followers created the Aikoku Kōtō 
(Public Patriotic Party).  Upon its creation, the association released a memorial which stipulated: 
Unable to resist the promptings of our patriotic feelings, we have sought to devise 
a means of rescuing it from this danger.  We find this means to consist in 
developing public discussion in the empire.  The means of developing public 
discussion is the establishment of a council-chamber chosen by the people.  Then 
a limit will be placed on the power of the officials, and high and low will obtain 
peace and prosperity.
16
 
The creation of the Aikoku Kōtō helped to establish a much wider political movement that was 
known as the Jiyū Minken Undō (Freedom and Popular Rights Movement).  In order to begin 
developing an ideological foundation for the Jiyū Minken Undō, members of the Aikoku Kōtō 
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began to translate works that dealt with Western political thought.  Those works that influenced 
the thinking as well as writing of the Jiyū Minken Undō included the writings of such individuals 
as: John Stuart Mill and his works On Liberty and Considerations on Representative 
Government.  One member of the Jiyū Minken Undō had written that: “We have come together 
because government is for the people, and inherent rights of life and personal freedom, which are 
higher than the mountains and deeper than the sea, will endure forever on this earth.”
17
  In order 
to help spread the message that was being dispensed by the Jiyū Minken Undō, two additional 
associations were created: the Risshisha (Self-Help Society) was established in the spring of 
1874, and the Aikokusha (Society of Patriots). 
 In order to prevent more former samurai in joining Itagaki and the Jiyū Minken Undō, the 
oligarchs, in particular Kido Takayoshi, tried to mend relations with Itagaki.  In 1875, Kido had 
the Daijō-kan create the Genrō-in (Senate), a institution that was meant to consult the oligarchs 
on all political matters.  On 11 February, 1875, Kido hosted the Osaka Conference and invited 
Itagaki to discuss the issue of representative government with the other oligarchs.  In an earlier 
memorial, Kido had written that: 
In enlightened countries, though there may be a sovereign, still he does not hold 
saw in an arbitrary fashion.  The people of the whole country give expression to 
their united and harmonious wishes, and the business of the State is arranged 
accordingly, a department (styled the government) being charged with the 
execution of their judgements, and officials appointed to transact business.  For 
this reason all who hold office respect the wishes of the whole nation and serve 
their country under a deep sense of responsibility, so that even in extraordinary 
crises, they take no arbitrary step contrary to the people’s will.
18
 
The significance of this conference should not be overlooked, since this was the first real 
discussion on constitutionalism that was undertaken by the oligarchs.  Failing to bring Itagaki 
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back into the oligarchy, Kido retired in late 1875.  Even without its creator, the Genrō-in 
continued to act as a consulting institution on all political matters for the oligarchy.  It had even 
drafted a constitution in 1876, but this draft was rejected by Prince Iwakura, since it had lacked 
preference to imperial sovereignty. 
 By the outset of 1877, the former samurai class was divided between two camps: Itagaki 
Taisuke and his Jiyū Minken Undō, and Saigō Takamori.  Upon returning to Satsuma, Saigō 
assumed a position as an administrator and helped establish military academies in the capital of 
the prefecture, Kagoshima.  When the oligarchs attempted to move a weapons cache from 
Kagoshima, students from one of the military academies that Saigō had helped establish 
prevented the government officials from carrying out their task.  What started as a minor dispute 
between military students and government officials over the control of weapons being held in a 
government arsenal erupted into full scale rebellion when the students began to muster more 
strength to prevent the officials from moving the weapons.  By the summer of 1877, Saigō had 
taken command of this small force and began to rally additional samurai units.  After the siege of 
Kumamoto Castle, Saigō was forced to retreat back to Kagoshima by a new conscript army that 
was led by Yamagata Aritomo.  The oligarchs eventually defeated the force that was led by 
Saigō on 24 September 1877 and Saigō himself committed ritual suicide upon witnessing the 
defeat of his forces. 
 Both Saigō Takamori and Kido Takayoshi died in 1877.  Ōkubo Toshimichi was 
assassinated by former samurai the following year in 1878.  The death of these three men 
allowed for the rise of a new generation of oligarchs.  One member of that new generation was 
Chōshū native Itō Hirobumi (1841 – 1909), another was Hizen native Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838 – 
1922).  Both men were careerists and had worked in the Daijō-kan throughout the turbulent 
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1870s.  The issue of a national assembly was brought up again in 1879 when all Sangi were 
ordered to submit their views on constitutionalism.  The two most favored constitutional systems 
at the time followed either the British or Prussian model.
19
  The last Sangi to submit his views on 
constitutionalism was Ōkuma Shigenobu. 
 When Ōkuma submitted his ideas on constitutionalism, the other oligarchs were shocked 
to find that Ōkuma’s views were radically different from their own.  The memorial that Ōkuma 
had prepared stated: 
1.  The date for the establishment of a parliament should be promulgated. . . . 2.  
High officials should be appointed on the basis of the support of the people. . . . In 
constitutional government, the place where the will of the people can be indicated 
is indeed the parliament.  What do I mean by “will of the people”?  It is the will of 
more than half of the parliamentary representatives.  Who commands the will?  It 
is the leader of the political party that has a majority in parliament. . . . 4.  With 
imperial approval, we should establish a constitution. . . . 5.  We should elect 
representatives by the end of 1882 and convoke a parliament at the beginning of 
1883.
20
 
In an attempt to defend himself, Ōkuma expanded upon his ideas further and stated that: 
“Constitutional government is party government, and the struggles between parties are the 
struggles of principles.  When its principles are supported by more than half of the people, a 
party wins control of the government.  When the opposite is true, it loses control.  This is the 
operation of genuine constitutional government.”
21
  As can be seen from his memorial, Ōkuma 
favored a parliamentary system that allowed the people to have representative government.  Most 
of the oligarchs were conservatives, and viewed the emperor as the only individual with the right 
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to govern.  As such, the oligarchs favored a system where imperial sovereignty was indisputable 
and protected.  Upon hearing of Ōkuma’s ideas on constitutionalism, Itō went into a rage and 
attempted to browbeat Ōkuma: 
Your memorial calls for selecting the heads of ministries and imperial house-hold 
officials from political parties.  In the finaly analysis this is equivalent to 
transferring the imperial prerogatives to the people.  Such heretical views should 
not be held by any subject.  I too, in confomority with the Imperial Rescript of 
1875, some day hope to see the establishment of a national assembly.
22
 
As a sign of protest should the oligarchs come to accept Ōkuma’s ideas, Itō offered his 
resignation from all of his posts since Ōkuma’s ideas countered the oligarchic principal of 
imperial sovereignty.  In order to keep the pressure on the oligarchs to finish the project and draft 
a constitution, Itagaki Taisuke decided to create a new organization, the Kokkai Kisei Dōmei 
(League for the Establishment of a National Assembly) in March 1880. 
 By the outset of 1881, the political infighting between Itō and Ōkuma had extended 
beyond their different views on constitutionalism.  Since the Meiji Revolution of 1868, the island 
of Hokkaido had received a large investment of capital and people.  The Hokkaido Colonization 
Office was responsible for turning the northern island into an integral part of the other three 
Japanese islands.  Satsuma native Kuroda Kiyotaka (1840 – 1900) was the founder of the 
Hokkaido Colonization Office and oversaw its expansion since the Meiji Revolution.  When 
Ōkuma released his ideas on constitutionalism in 1879, Itō and the oligarchs worked behind the 
scenes to get him ousted from office.  Despite the fact that large sums of money and people had 
been invested into the island of Hokkaido, the Hokkaido Colonization Office had failed to make 
significant progress.  Satsuma native Matsukata Masayoshi (1835 – 1924), who was an economic 
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advisor for the oligarchy, proposed to Kuroda that the assets of the Hokkaido Colonization 
Office should be sold to cover the remaining costs of the office. 
 Never out of touch with developments within the oligarchy, Ōkuma opposed Matsukata’s 
proposed stratagem for the Hokkaido Colonization Office.  Fearing that Ōkuma was attempting 
to garner public sympathy by opposing the plan to sell the assets of the Hokkaido Colonization 
Office, Itō decided that the time was right to make his move.  Utilizing both Ōkuma’s ideas on 
constitutionalism and his opposition to the proposed Hokkaido sale, Itō organized support 
amongst the other oligarchs and had Ōkuma ousted from office.  Since Ōkuma was from the 
domain of Hizen, the ousting of Ōkuma from the oligarchy in late 1881 allowed for the creation 
of a much more centralized alliance between the two domains of Satsuma and Chōshū.  Known 
as the Sat-chō Clique, this new alliance was made up of individuals like Chōshū natives Itō 
Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, as well as Satsuma natives Kuroda Kiyotaka, and Matsukata 
Masayoshi.  Following the success of the Kokkai Kisei Dōmei and the boost that it had given to 
the Jiyū Minken Undō during the crisis of 1881, Itagaki Taisuke decided to create the Jiyūtō 
(Liberal Party) on 1 October 1881.  A year following his ousting from office by Itō and the other 
oligarchs, Ōkuma Shigenobu decided to create the Rikken Kaishintō (Constitutional Progressive 
Party) on 16 March 1882.
23
  In order to prevent the Jiyū Minken Undō from gaining too much 
momentum, the oligarchs decided to establish the Rikken Teseitō (Constitutional Imperial Rule 
Party) on 18 March 1882. 
 
Sacred and Inviolable 
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With power firmly in the hands of the Sat-chō Clique, Itō felt confident enough to travel 
to Europe to study constitutions.  Leaving in early 1883, Itō traveled to Germany and Austria; 
spending most of his time in the capitals of Berlin and Vienna.  While in those countries, Itō 
utilized a trio of German scholars to assist him in understanding constitutionalism.  Those men 
were Rudolph von Gneist, Lorenz von Stein and Herman Roesler.  Through the work of these 
German scholars, Itō came to grasp various concepts related to constitutionalism as well as 
statecraft and had stated: “Thanks to the famous German scholars von Gneist and von Stein, I 
have come to understand the essential features of the structure and operation of the state. . . . the 
most crucial matter of fixing the foundations of our imperial system and of retaining the 
prerogatives belonging to it, I have already found sufficient substantiation. . . .”
24
  At the end of 
1883, Itō returned to Japan and began to make the necessary preparations towards the drafting 
and implementation of a constitution. 
 During the early years of their rule, the oligarchs had the Daijō-kan reform Japanese 
society to minimize traditional division within the population.  On 7 July 1884, Itō had the Daijō-
kan pass the Kazoku (Peerage Law) which created a new set of ranks and titles (based on 
German instances) within Japanese society.  There were six new ranks and titles which included: 
Prince, Duke, Marquis, Count, Viscount, and Baron.  In addition to these ranks and titles, a 
House of Peers was established which was to be the upper house of a bicameral Diet once it was 
created.  Many former daimyo and nobility that had lost their old ranks and prestige due to the 
reforms carried out by the oligarchs after the Meiji Revolution found themselves appointed to 
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these new ranks and titles by the emperor.
25
  Itō himself, along with Yamagata Aritomo were 
promoted to the rank of Marquis. 
 The next major reform that Itō enacted occurred in December of 1885, and involved the 
Daijō-kan, the traditional governing institution of the oligarchs.  Itō decided to replace the Daijō-
kan with a modern cabinet system.  Due to the high levels of influence and prestige that Itō had 
acquired as being one of the first Meiji statesmen, Itō became the first prime minister on 22 
December 1885.  In 1888, Itō felt prepared enough to begin the drafting of a constitution.  Before 
doing so however, Itō needed to create one more political institution.  That institution was the 
Privy Council.  The Privy Council was designed to replace the old oligarchic Genrō-in.  Like the 
Genrō-in, the Privy Council was to consult and deliberate on all political matters.  On 30 April 
1888, Itō resigned from the position of prime minister and became the head of the Privy Council. 
 For the next year, Itō would consult and deliberate with the other members of the Privy 
Council over the draft of the constitution that he was writing.  As a proponent of the Prussian 
political system, Itō favored the protection of imperial sovereignty rather than the expansion of 
popular sovereignty.  When writing the draft of the constitution, Itō relied on the advice of 
German scholar Herman Roesler.  Roesler’s advice had greatly influenced Itō who had written 
that “1.  The Japanese Empire shall remain an Imperial Monarchy, so that any form of 
government, and especially of republican government, can never be made the law of Japan.  2.  
The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by the Emperor.”
26
  Later during the 
drafting process Itō had written that: “Because imperial sovereignty is the cornerstone of our 
constitution, our system is not based on the European ideas in force in some European countries 
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of joint rule of the king and people.  This is the fundamental principle of this draft constitution, 
and it will become evident in every article.”
27
  As can be seen from this, the primary purpose of 
the constitution that Itō was writing was to ensure that imperial sovereignty was protected by the 
constitution. 
 Itō was clearly determined to preserve a dominant role for the Emperor in the constitution 
that he was drafting.  Itō did, however, incorporate a bicameral legislature in the draft.  This 
bicameral legislature was known as the Imperial Diet, and it consisted of two houses.  The upper 
house was known as the House of Peers (established with the Peerage Law of 1884) and a lower 
house known as the House of Representatives (to be established a year before the release of the 
constitution).  Towards the middle of 1888, Itō began to discuss his constitution with others in 
the Privy Council and often found himself defending what he had written.  One oligarch had 
questioned Itō as to the role that the Imperial Diet would play in the grand scheme.  Itō 
responded: “. . . .if we want to establish a constitutional government. . . .we have to give the right 
of decision to the Diet.  Without the consent of the Diet, budgets or laws cannot be determined.  
This is the essence of constitutional government.”
28
  While Itō was certainly no liberal, the 
incorporation of a bicameral legislature into the draft of his constitution showed that he was 
more than prepared to make a leap of faith and share power with others outside of the oligarchy.  
Furthermore, it may be surmised that by incorporating a bicameral legislature into the draft, Itō 
was in fact appeasing Emperor Meiji, whose own “. . . .wishes almost invariably were liberal and 
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progressive.”
29
  Itō nevertheless made sure that the powers of the bicameral legislature were 
severely restricted. 
 On 11 February 1889, the Empire of Japan was officially established when Emperor 
Meiji released the Constitution of the Empire of Japan to his subjects.
30
  Itō Hirobumi and the 
other oligarchs attended the opening ceremony, in which all were garbed in ceremonial pomp.  
The final draft of the constitution consisted of seven chapters, each of which had a number of 
articles attached to it describing the various functions and operations of the new state.  The 
preamble of the Meiji Constitution stated that: 
Having, by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the Throne of a lineal 
succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to 
give development to the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects, 
the very same that have been favored with the benevolent care and affectionate 
vigilance of Our Ancestors, and hoping to maintain the prosperity of the State, in 
concern with Our people and with their support, We hereby promulgate, in 
pursuance of Our Imperial Rescript [of 1881] a fundamental law of the State, to 
exhibit the principles, by which We are guided in Our conduct, and to point out to 
what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to 
conform.
31
 
Uncertainty as to whether or not the experiment would work must have plagued Itō during the 
final stages of the implementation of the constitution.  Being its author and as one of the first 
Japanese statesmen, Itō would have the privilege of observing and monitoring its operation 
during its early years.  Despite all of this, an examination of the Meiji Constitution shows that 
after a full year of intense deliberation, Itō had achieved his goals: the preservation of imperial 
sovereignty and the incorporation of a bicameral legislature.  The adoption of a constitution, a 
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nation-state’s fundamental laws, enabled the West to accept Japan and allow it to enter the 
modern world. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Meiji Constitution and Japanese Imperialism (1890 – 1912) 
 
 Soon after releasing the Meiji Constitutiton a new rank, that of genrō or Elder Statesmen, 
was created in order to reward oligarchs with a new position that would enable them to oversee 
the operation of the new state.  The genrō were already members of the ruling Sat-chō Clique, 
which included men like Itō Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo.  In July of 1890, elections were 
held for the lower House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet, the first democratic elections to 
be held in an Asiatic state.  The Rikken Jiyūtō (Constitutional Liberal Party) and the Rikken 
Kaishintō (Constitutional Progressive Party) – the opposition to the ruling Sat-chō Clique – won 
a majority in the lower House of Representatives.  During these early years of constitutional rule, 
the Sat-chō Clique practiced a concept known as chōzen naikaku, or transcendentalism.
32
  This 
concept is also referred to as transcendentalism, and was strongly favored by Yamagata Aritomo, 
since it delayed the nomination of political party members to the position of prime minister.  
Despite the fact that the opposition political parties had a majority in the lower house and battled 
the Sat-chō Clique over the budget, the political parties made no headway against the small 
ruling elite.  Part of the reason for this is that the political parties were more concerned with 
acquiring power over ideological unity.  The legacy of the later Meiji years was that continuing 
internal developments in both the economy and politics eventually led to the solidification of the 
political system created by Itō Hirobumi and others. 
 Yamagata Aritomo became Japan’s third prime minister on 24 December 1889.  During 
his tenure as prime minister, Yamagata oversaw the operation of the first session of the Imperial 
Diet.  The Jiyūtō and Kaishintō held a majority in the lower House of Representatives, and the 
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first item that the two parties attacked was the Sat-chō Clique’s proposed budget.  Displeased 
with the Sat-chō Clique’s proposed budget, the House Budgetary Committee decided to reduce 
the budget by 11% by making cuts in government expenditure.
33
  Deadlock followed as 
Yamagata was reluctant to negotiate with hostile political parties.  In late February 1891, 
Matsukata Masayoshi delivered a speech to the lower House of Representatives in which he 
stated: “Gentlemen, this Diet session is the first attempt at constitutional government in the 
Orient.  Since the success we have with constitutional government is intimately related to the 
honor of our nation, the government, with your reasonable and steadfast support, hopes to 
achieve consummate success.”
34
 
 To bring about a successful conclusion to their first Imperial Diet session, Japanese 
politicians had one of two options.  The first option was compromise, which would have to 
involve the mainstream political parties as well as the Sat-chō Clique.  The second option, which 
was favored strongly by Yamagata Aritomo, was to dissolve the Imperial Diet.  Itō Hirobumi, 
who was tending to other matters of statecraft, commented angrily: 
I said that dissolution is the ultimate measure to be employed when the 
government finds itself in a dangerous position where it can do nothing else.  
However, I cannot be sympathetic to any proposal that includes the suggestion for 
a dissolution, simply because the prime minister, on observing the situation, gets 
excited and fells that there possibly will be in the future a violation of the 
constitution or a contravention of laws.
35
 
Since the lower House of Representative’s only real power lay within approving of the state’s 
annual budget, it should come to no surprise that the political parties within this institution would 
exercise all of their power on this single issue.  While the Jiyūtō and Kaishintō were indeed 
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strong, one major problem that Japanese political parties faced was internal weakness or a lack of 
unity, which ultimately lead to factionalism.  In early 1891, several members of the Jiyūtō who 
were from Tosa, formed a splinter group and approached the Sat-chō Clique with an offer of 
compromise.
36
  With this new found support from the Tosa-Jiyūtō, the Sat-chō Clique was able 
to get its budget passed in the lower house, ending the political deadlock. 
 Matsukata Masayoshi succeeded Yamagata as prime minister on 6 May 1891.  After 
witnessing the obstructionism that occurred in the lower House of Representatives by the Jiyūtō 
and the Kaishintō, Yamagata Aritomo proposed a new strategy that would hopefully grant the 
Sat-chō Clique greater control over the lower House of Representatives.  That new strategy was 
election interference and involved bribery as well as violence.
37
  Despite having employed this 
new strategy, the Jiyūtō and the Kaishintō remained firmly in control of the lower House of 
Representatives.  A budgetary crisis, and an inability to fill two vacant cabinet positions, forced 
Matsukata to resign from the position of prime minister.  Itō Hirobumi succeeded Matsukata as 
prime minister on 8 August 1892. 
 
The Beginning of Japanese Imperialism 
 
 As with the Yamagata and Matsukata cabinets, Itō’s second cabinet began with a budget 
crisis.  While Itō was attempting to formulate a compromise, attention was shifting towards 
foreign affairs.  The major foreign policy issue involved treaty revision with the major Western 
powers.  But the Imperial Diet was still as unruly as ever, and refused to compromise with Itō on 
any policy issue.  The opposition within the Imperial Diet forced Itō to consult with Yamagata 
on the matter.  Yamagata stated that: 
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It is useless for the Government to consult this kind of assembly.  No matter how 
conciliatory the approach may be, the Diet has no desire to listen.  If this Diet 
continues, the dignity of the Government will suffer and the confidence of the 
people will be shaken.  Under these circumstances, I believe there is no other 
course than to settle unhesitatingly on a policy of dissolution.
38
 
Before Itō could act upon this advice, Itō’s cabinet was struck by a motion of no-confidence by 
the Imperial Diet.  This time however, Emperor Meiji decided to utilize his power and refused to 
approve the motion of no-confidence; this intervention by Emperor Meiji saved Itō’s cabinet.  
The lower House of Representatives had obstructed Itō long enough and ordered it to be 
dissolved.  It should be noted that this was the first time that the Imperial Diet was dissolved, and 
it was dissolved by the author of the Meiji Constitution.  With the Imperial Diet dissolved, Great 
Britain and Japan were eventually able to reach an accord, and the Treaty of London was signed 
on 16 July 1894.  This treaty was primarily concerned with removing economic privileges and 
extraterritoriality that had been given to the British during the early Meiji years.  The signing of 
this new treaty between Great Britain and the Empire of Japan meant that relations between the 
two powers had finally normalized. 
 During the summer of 1894, Korea emerged as a topic of concern and interest to the 
Japanese.  A small and independent nation, Korea was a potential threat to both China and Japan 
due to its geographic location.  On 1 June 1894, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River to 
support the Korean monarchy against rebels.
39
  The top Japanese diplomat in Korea advised the 
Koreans to sign “a treaty under which Korea accepts Japanese protection [and intervention] in 
Korea’s domestic and foreign affairs so as to achieve progress and reform, leading to wealth and 
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strength; for thereby we will on the one hand make Korea a strong bulwark for Japan. . . .”
40
  
Hostilities between China and Japan began on 1 August 1894, resulting in the First Sino-
Japanese War.  On 17 September 1894, Imperial Japanese forces won simultaneous victories in 
the Yellow Sea and on land near Pyongyang, a major Korean city.  By the end of 1894, the 
Imperial Japanese forces had destroyed most of the Chinese forces that had been arrayed against 
them. 
 The victory that had been won by the Imperial Japanese forces was made possible due to 
the adoption of modern tactics and weapons.  The victory was so complete that by the end of 
1894, the Chinese sued for peace.  Hostilities came to an end on 17 April 1895 when both 
powers signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  The treaty was negotiated by Itō, and represented the 
first step towards Japanese imperialism.  The treaty was composed of four articles.  The first 
demand was a Chinese recognition of Korean independence.  The second demand involved 
China ceding the following to the Empire of Japan: the Liadong Peninsula, the island of Taiwan, 
and the Pescadores.  The third demand involved the opening of four treaty ports which would 
enable the Japanese to expand influence and trade into mainland China.  The fourth and final 
demand involved a large indemnity.
41
  Before the Japanese could fully enjoy the fruits of victory, 
however, a “Triple Intervention”, which was composed of France, Germany and Russia, 
pressured Tokyo into returning the Liaodong peninsula to China.  Fearful of possible Western 
retaliation for having gone too far, the Japanese returned the peninsula to Chinese sovereignty. 
 During the war, the lower House of Representatives and the ruling Sat-chō Clique 
reached unprecedented levels of cooperation.  The Japan Weekly Mail commentated that: “The 
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task the House had been asked to achieve in seven days it accomplished in three, a striking 
contrast to its custom on previous occasions . . . The House has acquitted itself so well, there will 
be less disposition to assert that the Japanese are unfit for constitutional government.”
42
  One of 
the major factors that led to smoother operations in the lower House of Representatives was a 
tentative alliance between Itō’s cabinet and the Jiyūtō.  In order to avoid obstructionism, Itō was 
willing to compromise with the political parties during the war and refrained from utilizing 
chōzen naikaku and offered Itagaki Taisuke, the president of the Jiyūtō, the position of Home 
Minister.
43
  This promise was fulfilled in the summer of 1896.  After 1896, two factors changed 
the relationship between the lower House of Representatives and the ruling Sat-chō Clique.  The 
first one involved the Triple Intervention.  The second one involved the political parties; in 
particular the Kaishintō was beginning to change internally.  Desiring more power within the 
lower House of Representatives, the Kaishintō decided to merge with other small political groups 
to form the Rikken Shimpotō (Constitutional Progressive Party).  Due to its numerically 
improved stature, the Shimpotō began to negotiate for positions within the next cabinet, openly 
competing with the Jiyūtō for positions of power. 
 Matsukata Masayoshi was given a second chance to be prime minister and accepted the 
position on 18 September 1896.  Following Itō’s example with the Jiyūtō, Matsukata decided to 
refrain from using the policy of transcendentalism and approached the Shimpotō leader, Ōkuma 
Shigenobu with the promise of possible cabinet positions.  Before he could complete his cabinet, 
however, Matsukata was defeated by Yamagata Aritomo.  In an attempt to increase the budget 
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for more military spending, Yamagata proposed an increase to the overall land tax.
44
  This was 
staunchly opposed by the mainstream political parties, but strongly supported by the ruling Sat-
chō Clique.  As such, before Matsukata could even complete cabinet negotiations with the 
Shimpotō; Matsukata had to resign from the position of prime minister due to opposition 
stemming from both the Shimpotō and the Sat-chō Clique.  Itō subsequently became prime 
minister for a third time on 12 January 1898, and he immediately attempted to form a combined 
Jiyūtō and Shimpotō cabinet.  But Itō’s attempt to form a coalition between the two mainstream 
political parties was wrecked by interparty rivalry and a budgetary crisis once the budget failed 
to get voted on by the lower House of Representatives.  Therefore, Itō resigned from the position 
of prime minister on 30 June 1898.  On the same day that Itō resigned from his post as prime 
minister, Ōkuma and Itagaki met to discuss the formation of the Rikken Kenseitō (Constitutional 
Government Party). 
 Following the creation of the Kenseitō, Itō suggested to Emperor Meiji that Ōkuma and 
Itagaki form a cabinet.  The incorporation of the Kenseitō and its leadership into a position of 
power such as cabinet formation was a great leap of faith by Itō.  Upon announcing the decision 
to form a cabinet based on the Kenseitō, the newspaper Jiji shimpō commentated that: “His 
Imperial Majest, by receiving Ōkuma and Itagaki in special audience and commanding them to 
form a cabinet, has determined that henceforth the cabinet will be formed by whatever party 
holds a majority in the Diet.  It may be safely said, then, that the foundation of the party cabinet 
system has been established.”
45
  This seemed to portend the end of chōzen naikaku as a viable 
policy.  However, as with Itō’s attempt to form a coalition between the Jiyūtō and the Shimpotō, 
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the Ōkuma-Itagaki administration was wrecked by interparty rivalry.  Before being able to 
accomplish anything worthwhile, the Ōkuma-Itagaki cabinet collapsed when the Kenseitō 
divided itself between the former Jiyūtō and Shimpotō political parties.  During the summer of 
1898, the split became formal when the Jiyūtō took the Kenseitō as its name, while the Shimpotō 
renamed itself the Rikken Kenseihontō or Original Constitutional Government Party.
46
 
 Yamagata Aritomo became prime minister for a second time on 8 November 1898 and 
brought much needed stability to the Japanese political system.  As the chief proponent of 
transcendental cabinets, Yamagata ironically decided that the time was right to end the policy, 
and struck an alliance with the Kenseitō in the fall of 1898.  Yamagata’s change in thinking 
towards the political parties was best summed up by Saigō Tsugumichi (1843 – 1902) who stated 
that: 
Under a constitutional system of government nothing can be achieved without the 
consent of the majority party.  Consequently, at times, to bow to the orders of the 
[majority] party becomes unavoidable.  Even though at times their demands are 
unreasonable, we must accept them.  In order to achieve the great aims of the 
nation we must bear minor irritations.  Looking at the larger picture, we must be 
willing to sacrifice a little inconvenience and advantage.
47
 
While the Sat-chō Clique may have recognized the need to incorporate the Kenseitō into 
important administrative duties, Ōkuma Shigenobu had noticed that the: “[Members] of the 
Kenseitō were not taken into the cabinet.  However, as compensation, the Kenseitō was given 
control over local administration . . .”
48
  In addition to this, Yamagata had given the Kenseitō 
permission to embark on election reform.  Despite this, Yamagata had not completely changed 
his mind.  In order to secure the Sat-chō Clique’s power from future incursions made by the 
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political parties, Yamagata had the House of Representatives pass two pieces of legislation that 
accomplished the goal of preservation.  The first piece of legislation dealt with the army and 
navy minister positions.  Yamagata made it so that only active-duty admirals and generals could 
serve in their respective positions.  The second piece of legislation that was passed was the 
Chian Keisatsu-ho, or Peace Police Law, which greatly increased and strengthened the police 
forces of the Meiji state.
49
 
 The main reason why Yamagata had the Imperial Diet pass the Peace Police Law was to 
protect the position of the Emperor and the state from the radical Left.  Towards the end of the 
oligarchic years, Christian converts had begun to read and then preach Socialist ideology as it 
was presented to them by the writings of Karl Marx.  In 1901, Abe Isoo (1865 – 1949) one of 
Japan’s first widely renowned Socialists, established the Shakai Minshutō, or Socialist 
Democratic Party.
50
  While the Shakai Minshutō dissolved itself within a few months of its 
founding, Socialist thinking had arrived in Japan to compete with the dominant economic theory, 
capitalism.  As such, even before the radical Left could attempt to establish itself, it had to 
contend with the Peace Police Law, in addition to an already dominant-prevailing economic 
theory. 
 While lasting only two years, Yamagata’s second tenure as prime minister was a 
resounding success for all involved.  Important strides were made by the Sat-chō Clique in that 
as a group they seemed to finally accept the political parties as necessary and acceptable partners 
in administrating the country.  In addition to this, the prestige and power of the political parties 
had greatly increased as well as a result of this partnership.  Yamagata’s alliance with the 
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Kenseitō did eventually come to an end.  On 15 September 1900, Itō established the Rikken 
Seiyūkai (Constitutional Association of Political Friends) and immediately began to contend with 
the Kenseitō for seats in the lower House of Representatives.  Following this weakening of the 
Kenseitō, Yamagata resigned from the position of prime minister on 19 October 1900.  Before 
leaving office, Yamagata had been preparing Katsura Taro (1848 – 1913) – who was an old 
military friend – to be his successor and protégé.  With his new found power in the Seiyūkai 
however, Itō became prime minister for a fourth time on 19 October 1900.  Despite having 
formed the Seiyūkai and having a majority in the lower House of Representatives, Itō’s fourth 
tenure as prime minister was as short as his third (January – June 1898).  Facing a combined 
budget and leadership crisis, Itō resigned from office on 10 May 1901.
51
  On 2 June 1901, 
Yamagata’s protégé Katsura Taro succeeded Itō as prime minister. 
 
The Rise of Japanese Nationalism 
 
 Like past prime ministers, Katsura Taro had to contend with an unruly Imperial Diet.  
Part of the reason for this was due to Katsura’s firm belief in transcendental cabinets.  Unlike 
Yamagata, who had learned his lesson after his first tenure as prime minister, Katsura still 
needed to learn his.  Domestic affairs were about to replace foreign affairs as the top priority of 
the government.  In 1902, Katsura conducted negotiations with Great Britain to form an alliance.  
Ever since the Triple Intervention, tension between Japan and Russia had been steadily 
increasing.  In 1900, Russia joined with the other European powers to divide China into spheres 
of influence  and stake a claim in East Asia.  Through its historic expansion in Siberia, Russia 
claimed all of Outer Mongolia and Manchuria as its sphere of influence.  To counter the 
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influence of the Japanese in Korea, Queen Min and King Kojong of Korea decided to expand 
diplomatic ties with Russia.
52
  Upon hearing the news of Russian involvement in Korea, a Major 
General in the Imperial Japanese Army stated: 
There is no longer room for discussion.  We must fight Russia even if it means 
defeat.  Our struggle for arms expansion has had only one purpose: to fight Russia 
. . . If we do not fight now, it is evident that Russia, which has been invading the 
Far East in full force, will soon replenish its strength in Manchuria and advance 
into Korea.  In that case, an agreement between Japan and Russia will come to be 
only a piece of paper, and Japan will inevitably be shut out of the Continent . . .
53
 
Diplomacy and negotiations between the two countries continued on throughout the fall of 1903, 
but war fever was clearly building within Japan.  Realizing that the Russians would not give up 
their growing presence in East Asia, the Japanese finally gave up on diplomacy and prepared for 
war.  Following Japan’s surprise attacks upon Russian ships in Port Arthur, war was declared 
between the Empire of Japan and Russia on 6 February 1904. 
 Honoring its 1902 alliance with Japan, Great Britain blocked Russian sea traffic through 
the Suez Canal.  This gave the Japanese valuable time to acquire military supremacy on land; 
and from August 1904 – January 1905, the Imperial Japanese Army secured the Liaodong 
peninsula for a second time by seizing the Russian stronghold of Port Arthur.  Japanese troops 
also landed at Seoul and Pyongyang, securing the Korean peninsula from Russian invasion.  On 
27 May 1905, the Imperial Japanese Navy destroyed the Russian Baltic Fleet, which had to sail 
from Europe around the Horn of Africa, in the Battle of the Tsushima Straits granting Japan its 
second major victory in the war.  Despite this, the Russians made negotiations difficult for the 
Japanese, who in turn decided to utilize U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt as a mediator.  On 5 
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September 1905, Russia and the Empire of Japan signed the Treaty of Portsmouth.  It contained 
three articles which officially turned Japan into a major world power.  The first article involved 
Korea, which was turned into a Japanese protectorate.  The second article handed over the 
Russian lease in the Liaodong peninsula to Japanese control.  The third article involved the 
transfer of Russian interests (railroad and mining rights) in Manchuria to the Japanese.
54
 
 One of the major developments that occurred during the late Meiji years was the 
inexorable rise of nationalism.  For some time the oligarchs had perpetuated the idea of the 
kokutai, or ‘national polity’.  The Imperial Rescript on Education, which was released in 1890, is 
often regarded as being an expression of this idea.  It stipulated:  “Our Imperial Ancestors 
founded our empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly planted virtue; 
Our subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have from generation to generation, 
illustrated the beauty thereof.  This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Nation. . . 
.”
55
 Continuing on, the document then stated: “. . . .furthermore, advance public good and 
promote common interests; always respect the constitution and observe the laws; should 
emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the state; and thus guard and maintain the 
prosperity of our imperial throne coeval with heaven and earth.”
56
  By the turn of the twentieth 
century, ultra-nationalist societies were beginning to form, particularly within the Japanese 
military, which further helped to establish this growing sense of nationalism.  One of the first 
ultra-nationalist societies to form was the Kokuryukai, or the Black Dragon Society. 
                                                          
54See McClain, Japan: A Modern History, 306. 
 
55Cited in Sources of Japanese Tradition, 780. 
 
56Ibid. 
29 
 
 The Japanese public, who showed a great amount of support for the state and armed 
forces during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 - 05, felt betrayed by the lack of concessions 
granted to the Japanese by the Russians in the Treaty of Portsmouth.  In addition to ultra-
nationalist societies like the Black Dragon Society, the mass media helped to spread the idea that 
a much larger victory had been achieved during the war among the Japanese public.  In their 
opening memorial, the Black Dragons had also stated that: “in order to check the expansion of 
the Western Powers in the East, and to promote the development and prosperity of East Asia, it 
is the urgent duty of Japan to fight Russia and expel her from the East, and then to lay the 
foundation for a grand continental enterprise taking Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia as one 
region.”
57
  As a result of this, some 30,000 people protested in Hibiya Park in Tokyo, and the 
government was forced to declare martial law. 
 As with the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894 – 95, the Imperial Diet cooperated with the 
cabinet in power and passed several large budgets which helped prepare the country for war.  
Prince Saionji Kinmochi (1849 – 1940), who was a member of the imperial family, succeeded 
Katsura Taro as prime minister once the Hibiya Park Riots had been quelled.  Faced with a 
budget crisis and riots caused by a joint Anarchist-Socialist movement, Prince Saionji decided to 
resign from office on 14 July 1908.  On the same day that Saionji left office, Katsura began his 
second tenure as prime minister.  Despite having lost ground while under Saionji’s first cabinet, 
the Seiyūkai regained a majority in the 1908 general elections.
58
  As a result of this, Katsura 
needed to compromise in order to have a successful cabinet.  Despite having made concessions 
to the Seiyūkai, Katsura’s tenure as prime minister was still difficult.  Prince Saionji, who was 
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president of the Seiyūkai, had only offered a limited amount of support, and this was tenuous.
59
  
The first major development of Katsura’s cabinet occurred in May 1910 and involved yet another 
joint Anarchist-Socialist attempt on the monarchy.  The Taigyaku Jiken or High Treason Incident 
was an attempt by Anarchist-Socialists to assassinate Emperor Meiji.  Through the Peace Police 
Law of 1900, the state was able to arrest anyone suspected to be involved with the incident.  The 
second major development of Katsura’s tenure as prime minister involved Korea.  Various 
members of Katsura’s cabinet thought that the protectorate of Korea should be ended and Korea 
should be annexed by Japan.  The cabinet eventually passed a resolution on 22 August 1910 
which annexed Korea to Japan. 
 Soon after Katsura’s second tenure as prime minister, Emperor Meiji died of natural 
causes on 30 July 1912.  While under Meiji’s reign, Japan underwent great changes.  It 
transformed itself from a feudal society into a modern constitutional monarchy.  During the early 
years of the constitutional system, the mainstream political parties and the oligarchs were bitter 
enemies and consistently fought with one another over the nation’s budget.  The First Sino-
Japanese War of 1894 – 95 showed that the Imperial Diet and the ruling Sat-chō Clique could 
indeed cooperate during a time of national crisis.  In the final analysis, several members of the 
Sat-chō Clique, in particular Itō Hirobumi, underestimated the power that the political parties 
had obtained since their founding in the Popular Rights Movement.  The ability to cripple the 
government by not approving of or passing the annual budget was the greatest weapon that the 
political parties had.  As long as the political parties maintained a majority in the lower House of 
Representatives, they held all the cards in regards to the state’s annual budget.  Realizing the 
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power that they held, the political parties gradually began to demand cabinet positions and the 
ability to pass legislation. 
 However, one of the greatest weaknesses of the political parties was their inability to 
maintain a strong unified center.  The ability of members to merge, and associate themselves 
with other parties was relatively easy.  By the beginning of the twentieth century, the political 
parties began to mature and became stable units within the lower House of Representatives.  Itō 
Hirobumi’s Rikken Seiyūkai is an example of a political party that matured over time.  Composed 
of former Jiyūtō members, the Seiyūkai would continue well into the twentieth century as a 
major component of Japanese politics.  Despite this growing influence, prime ministers could 
still refuse the demands of the political parties by utilizing the old policy of chōzen naikaku, or 
nonparty cabinets (transcendentalism).  Several prime ministers did so, resulting in short cabinet 
terms.  As such, both sides had to learn how to deal with one another and compromise.  In 
addition to this, the idea of being “Japanese” had come to fruition as a result of the two conflicts 
that emerged during the final years of Emperor Meiji’s reign.   
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Chapter 3 
 
The Taishō Years (1912 – 1926) 
 
 The death of Emperor Meiji on 30 July 1912 ushered in a new period of Japanese 
politics.  Optimism for the newly inaugurated Emperor Taishō gave way to quiet concern as it 
became known that the new monarch was inept due to mental illness.  Concern over Emperor 
Taishō’s condition led the genrō to begin preparing Emperor Meiji’s grandson Shōwa for 
regency (who would assume the title of regent in 1922).  One of the most notable themes present 
in Taishō period politics is the interchange between military and political party prime ministers.  
Not one military clique or political party held onto the reins of power over an extended period of 
time.  Political intellectualism also flourished during the latter years of the Taishō period, further 
enriching this period.  The political system that Itō Hirobumi had created in the 1880s was not 
threatened by either the death of Emperor Meiji or the ineptitude of Emperor Taishō; but was in 
fact strengthened since all involved in Japanese politics continued to function within the 
parameters of that system as it was instituted by the Meiji Constitution. 
 Presiding over the position of prime minister at the time of Emperor Meiji’s death was 
Prince Saionji.  In 1911, the Imperial Japanese Army wanted to expand and approached Prince 
Saionji in order to add two more divisions.  Prince Saionji saw no reason for the expansion, 
however, and refused to expand the budget.  The army approached Prince Saionji for a second 
time in 1912, and Prince Saionji refused again.  As a result of this, the Minister of the Army 
resigned in protest to the decision.  With the army hostile to him over his refusal over military 
expansion, Prince Saionji was unable to find a replacement for the position, and unwilling to 
change his stance on military expansion, Prince Saionji decided to offer his resignation on 21 
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December 1912.  After accepting Prince Saionji’s resignation, the genrō began the process of 
choosing the next prime minister. 
 
The Early Taishō Years 
 
 It soon became apparent to the genrō that either Yamagata Aritomo, or Katsura Tarō 
would have to become the next prime minister.
60
  But neither really wanted the position.  For 
Yamagata, his advanced age was the major contributing factor in his decision to decline the offer 
for the position.  Katsura had just recently acquired great influence at the court and was acting as 
an imperial adviser for Emperor Taishō.  When he finally accepted the position, many in the 
lower house of the Imperial Diet felt that Katsura had used this influence to acquire the position.  
As such, the Seiyūkai decided to launch a populist campaign against Katsura.  Known as the 
“Movement to Protect the Constitution,” this populist movement started in the Imperial Diet but 
spread to other parts of Japan due to its Seiyūkai foundations.  In addition to this opposition from 
the “Movement to Protect the Constitution,” Katsura had to contend with the Imperial Japanese 
Navy.  While forming his cabinet, Katsura faced stark opposition from the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, which refused to supply him with an admiral for the position of Minister of the Navy.  The 
opposition from the Imperial Japanese Navy was a direct result of Katsura being a former 
general in the Imperial Japanese Army.  In an attempt to end the interference that resulted from 
the navy’s opposition, Katsura decided to appeal to Emperor Taishō for assistance and order the 
Imperial Japanese Navy to supply an admiral by order of an Imperial Rescript. 
 In order to be able to pass any legislation in the lower house of the Imperial Diet, which 
had been dominated by the Seiyūkai since its founding in 1900, Katsura began to consider the 
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possibility of forming his own political party.  The formation of a political party would not only 
give Katsura the means to formulate and pass legislation, but also act as a platform from which 
Katsura could build additional power.  On 7 February 1913, Katsura followed in the footsteps of 
Itō Hirobumi and established his own political party.  That political party was known as the 
Rikken Dōshikai (Constitutional Association of Friends) and was predominantly composed of 
members of the lower house of the Imperial Diet who shared anti-Seiyūkai sentiments.  The 
decision to create the Dōshikai strained relations not only with the Seiyūkai, but also with 
Yamagata Aritomo, who never completely abandoned the oligarchic concept of 
transcendentalism.  Towards the end of 1913, Admiral Yamamoto Gonnohyōe (1852 – 1933) 
suggested to Katsura that he should resign from the position of prime minister.  Faced with 
ongoing opposition from the Imperial Japanese Navy, as well as the “Movement to Protect the 
Constitution,” Katsura decided to resign from the position of prime minister.  One possible 
reason why Katsura decided to resign from the post was a desire to complete the formation of the 
Dōshikai.  Katsura had commented: “The genrō until recently seem to have held the center of 
political power, but they are growing old and falling into decline. . . . The time for the 
establishment of party cabinets is approaching, and when it comes, it will be impossible to face 
the political situation to come without a party at one’s command.”
61
  Unfortunately, however, 
before he could finish his designs for the Dōshikai, Katsura would die on 10 October 1913.
62
 
 Since he had played a role in getting Katsura to resign from the position of prime 
minister, the genrō decided to nominate Admiral Yamamoto to the position of prime minister, 
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and on 20 February 1913, Admiral Yamamoto decided to accept the offer.  In an attempt to gain 
nominal Seiyūkai support, and to put an end to the “Movement to Protect the Constitution,” 
Admiral Yamamoto agreed to nominate Seiyūkai members to his cabinet.  A financial scandal 
involving high-ranking officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy and the German Siemens 
company resulted in the eventual collapse of the Yamamoto cabinet.
63
  Once the scandal became 
public knowledge, Admiral Yamamoto faced intense public pressure and outcry and was forced 
to resign.  On 23 March 1914, Admiral Yamamoto offered his resignation and stepped down 
from the position of prime minister. 
 After accepting the resignation of Admiral Yamamoto, the genrō began the process of 
choosing the next prime minister.  Rather than nominate another Seiyūkai member as prime 
minister, and not trusting the position to the untested Dōshikai president Katō Komei (1860 – 
1926), the genrō decided to nominate Ōkuma Shigenobu to the position for a second time.  
Ōkuma accepted the nomination on 16 April 1914.  In order to gain support in the lower house of 
the Imperial Diet, Ōkuma Shigenobu appointed Katō Komei to the position of Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and utilized several other Dōshikai members in his cabinet.  Ōkuma would join 
the Dōshikai at a later date and become a senior member.  On 28 July 1914, the First World War 
began when the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on Serbia and a series of military 
alliances among the great powers quickly led Europe into total war.  In the fall of 1914, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Katō Komei, decided to bring the Empire of Japan into the war on the side of 
the Allies (as part of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902) and declared war on the German 
Empire.  By 7 November 1914, the Imperial Japanese Army seized the port of Tsingtao and all 
                                                          
63See Sims, Japanese Political History, 115. 
36 
 
German held territory within the Shandong peninsula.  Simultaneously the Imperial Japanese 
Navy seized the German colony of Micronesia in the Pacific.   
 With the Western powers preoccupied with the conflict in Europe, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Katō Komei, sought to pressure the Chinese and continue to expand Japanese 
influence in the region.  Through secret consultation, Katō worked together with Black Dragon 
Society leader Uchida Ryōhei (1873 – 1937) and the two men would eventually drafted the 
“Twenty-one Demands,” a series of demands with which the Japanese hoped to pressure China 
into granting them.  An early Black Dragon memorial stated: 
We should induce the Chinese revolutionists, the Imperialists and other 
malcontents to create trouble all over China.  The whole country will be thrown 
into disorder and Yuan’s government consequently overthrown. . . . We consider 
the present to be the most opportune moment.  The reason why these men cannot 
now carry on an active campaign is because they are insufficiently provided with 
funds.  If the Imperial Government can take advantage of this fact to make them a 
loan and instruct them to rise simultaneously, great commotion and disorder will 
surely prevail all over China.  We can then intervene and easily adjust matters. . 
.
64
 
By the time that the Imperial Japanese military had seized all of Germany’s colonial possessions 
in East Asia and the Pacific, the draft for the “Twenty-one Demands” had been complete.  After 
helping draft the “Twenty-one Demands,” Black Dragon leader Uchida lobbied for it to be 
passed onto the Chinese president Yuan Shikai (1859 – 1916). 
 While the primary purpose of the “Twenty-one Demands” was to expand Japanese 
influence in the region, Black Dragon leader Uchida and Katō sought to ensure that the influence 
that they had established would be long lasting.  Upon learning of the “Twenty-one Demands,” 
the United States ambassador to the region stated that if accepted, the document would: “place 
the Chinese State in a position of vassalage through exercising a control over important parts of 
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its administration and over its industrial and natural resources, actual and prospective.”
65
  The 
first two articles of the “Twenty-one Demands” dealt with the concessions that the Japanese had 
recently acquired during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 – 05, and the First World War.  Other 
provisions within the “Twenty-one Demands” greatly infringed upon Chinese sovereignty by 
granting “Japan joint ownership of the Hanyehping Iron Company and all adjacent iron ore 
deposits and requiring China not to cede any territory along her entire coastline to any other 
Power.  Group Five would give Japan the right to appoint Japanese political, financial and 
military advisers to the Chinese government.”
66
  The Chinese Republic was so feeble at the time 
that its president, Yuan Shikai, considered accepting the “Twenty-one Demands.”  Before doing 
so, however, the Chinese approached the Japanese in hopes of renegotiating the document.  The 
Japanese agreed to do so; and Chinese and Japanese diplomats began the process of negotiating a 
newly revised document throughout the fall of 1914 and into the spring of 1915.  After carefully 
weighing the newly revised document, Chinese diplomats finally signed it on 25 May 1915.  The 
new document forced the Japanese to return Tsingtao to Chinese sovereignty; while the Chinese 
granted the Japanese rights of extraterritoriality and land ownership in Manchuria and Inner 
Mongolia.
67
 
 Fearing that Katō had gone too far with his “Twenty-one Demands,” the genrō pressured 
Ōkuma into forcing Katō to resign from the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs.  Ōkuma 
carried out the genrō’s request, but soon found out that nobody was willing to replace Katō.  
Unable to fill the vacant cabinet position, Ōkuma decided to submit his resignation to the genrō 
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and opted to leave the position of prime minister on 4 October 1916.  The composition of the 
Imperial Diet throughout this period included several small political parties that sought to 
challenge the dominance of the Seiyūkai.  Following the collapse of the Ōkuma cabinet, Katō 
Komei began working to bring several of these other smaller political parties into a permanent 
merger with the Dōshikai.  A deal was eventually struck, and a new political party was created 
the day after Ōkuma turned in his resignation; this new political party was known as the Rikken 
Kenseikai (Constitutional Party) and began a political campaign in order to challenge the 
majority that the Seiyūkai had maintained in the Imperial Diet since its founding in 1900. 
 Following Ōkuma’s resignation from the position of prime minister, the genrō decided to 
appoint a former general of the Imperial Japanese Army, Terauchi Masatake (1852 – 1919) to the 
position of prime minister.  After some deliberation, Terauchi finally accepted the nomination on 
9 October 1916.  Although Prime Minister Terauchi had acquired nominal Seiyūkai support for 
his cabinet, the prime minister faced stern opposition from the Kenseikai.  This opposition from 
the Kenseikai came about due to Terauchi supporting the Seiyūkai over the Kenseikai when 
Terauchi was in the process of forming his cabinet.  Towards the end of 1916, the Kenseikai 
passed a motion of no-confidence in Terauchi as prime minister, forcing Terauchi to dissolve the 
Imperial Diet.  General elections were held the following year, 1917, in which neither the 
Kenseikai nor the Seiyūkai gained a majority.  Then in the fall of 1918, the country was 
devastated when the price of rice unexpectedly rose dramatically, resulting in riots erupting 
across the country.  Faced with a divided Imperial Diet, and a country that was becoming more 
unstable due to the nationwide rice riots, Terauchi decided to submit his resignation on 29 
September 1918. 
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 In order to avoid upsetting the general populace as well as the mainstream political 
parties with the appointment of yet another prime minister selected from the military, Prince 
Saionji decided to nominate Hara Kei (1856 – 1921), who was the president of the Seiyūkai.
68
  
Hara immediately organized a Seiyūkai cabinet and passed an electoral reform law which aided 
the Seiyūkai in regaining a majority in the Imperial Diet.  With control of the Imperial Diet 
assured, Hara passed bills that were based upon Seiyūkai policies, the first of which was to pass a 
large budget for internal development (bridges, port facilities, railways and road construction).  
The Hara cabinet was able to pass a large budget in part due to the huge surplus that had been 
generated by the First World War.  With the European powers largely concerned with what was 
transpiring on the continent, the markets in East Asia were left abandoned.  As a result of this, 
Japanese industries hurried to fill the void left by the Europeans, resulting in a boom for the 
Japanese economy during the war.  With the war concluded by the summer of 1919, however, 
the Europeans regained the economic initiative and returned to their pre-war colonial markets in 
East Asia.  This renewed challenge of European economic competition hit Japan in the latter part 
of 1920.  The Hara cabinet carried out a variety of economic measures and was eventually able 
to weather the economic crisis. 
 With the position of prime minister firmly in the hands of the Seiyūkai president Hara 
Kei, Prince Saionji felt confident enough to leave Japan in order to take part in the diplomatic 
conferences that were being held in Europe to bring an end to the First World War.  Traveling 
with Prince Saionji was the young Prince Konoe Fumimaro (1891 – 1945), whose lineage could 
be traced to the powerful Fujiwara clan and was educated at Kyoto Imperial University.  On 28 
June 1919, Japan took part in the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, which officially ended 
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hostilities and brought about world peace.  One of the agreements reached at Versaille between 
the Allies involved Japan sending troops into Eastern Siberia to prevent the Communists from 
taking over the region, as part of the Allied Intervention during the Russian Civil War.  In 
addition to this, Hara decided to appease the genrō by passing a bill which strengthened the 
Peace Police Law of 1900.  After having been in office for over three years, the continuation of 
the Hara cabinet for a fourth seemed more than likely.  However, on 4 November 1921, Hara 
was assassinated by an ultranationalist.  While the assassination of Hara was devastating to the 
Seiyūkai, it also had a profound impact on the development of constitutional government for the 
remainder of the Taishō period. 
 
The Blossoming of Liberalism 
 
 Representing liberalism in Taishō Japan was Yoshino Sakuzō (1878 – 1933).  A graduate 
of the renowned Tokyo Imperial University, Yoshino began work as an advisor / tutor to the 
Chinese leader Yuan Shikai.  Upon returning to Japan, Yoshino obtained a position within his 
alma mater and began to study law.  At the request of Tokyo Imperial University, Yoshino 
traveled throughout the West in order to study the constitutional systems found in France, 
Germany, Great Britain and the United States.  After completing his tour of the West, Yoshino 
began to write extensively on democracy and foreign affairs.  In 1916, Yoshino’s seminal work, 
Kensei No Hongi o Toite Sono Yūshū No Bi o Seishu No To o Ronzu, or “On the Meaning of 
Constitutional Government and the Methods By Which It Can Be Perfected” was published.  In 
this work, Yoshino briefly discusses what constitutional government is to his readers and then 
develops an idea that is known as minponshugi or “government based on the people.” 
 In order to begin the discussion within his work, Yoshino states that “a constitution must 
include as an important part of its contents the following three provisions: (1) guarantees of civil 
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liberties, (2) the principle of the separation of the three branches of government, and (3) a 
popularly elected legislature.”
69
  Later within the same discussion on constitutions, Yoshino 
stated that “more than any other factor, [provision for a popularly elected legislature]. . . .is 
regarded by the public as the most important characteristic of a constitution. . . . Why is the 
provision so important?  Because the popularly elected legislature is the only branch of 
government in whose composition the people have a direct voice.”
70
  While it is true that the 
Empire of Japan was created as a constitutional monarchy in 1889, the Meiji Constitution 
featured very weak democratic processes.  This was intentional, since Itō Hirobumi wanted to 
utilize the constitution as a way to protect imperial sovereignty. 
 After introducing the reader to Constitutionalism, Yoshino began to discuss the concept 
of democracy.  When discussing democracy Yoshino had to tread carefully, for not only would 
he face stark criticism from his peers, but possible political repercussions handed down to him 
from the ruling elite should he advocate anything that compromised the principle of imperial 
sovereignty.  As such, it was necessary for Yoshino to develop his ideas on democracy 
cautiously and methodically.  This resulted in the creation of two new terms: (1) minponshugi 
(people as the basic principle) and (2) minshushugi (people’s rule principle).  The main reason 
why Yoshino developed two terms for democracy was due to the issue that it created when it was 
coupled with the concept of imperial sovereignty.  In his article, Yoshino stated that minshushugi 
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“is likely to be understood referring to the theory held by the social democratic parties that 
‘sovereignty of the nation resides in the people.”
71
  Continuing his article, Yoshino stated that: 
So-called minponshugi is not concerned with the legal locus of sovereignty, but 
refers to the principle that the rule of sovereignty should consider the welfare of 
the people.  In other words, it is the political theory that sets the guiding standards 
on the deployment of state authority; it does not ask whether the sovereignty lies 
within the king or the people.
72
 
By stating that the main purpose of democracy was the “general welfare of the people,” and not 
of popular sovereignty, Yoshino avoided the controversial coupling of democracy and imperial 
sovereignty. 
 After having introduced the reader to constitutionalism and the concept of minponshugi; 
Yoshino changes the topic of “On the Meaning of Constitutional Government” to that of reform 
and universal manhood suffrage.  In his writing, Yoshino made it clear that he knew political 
corruption existed within Japan’s limited suffrage system and wrote that: “When legislators 
manipulate the people, invariably corruption and bad government flourish.  Only when the 
people control their legislators does the operation of constitutional government follow the proper 
course.”
73
  One way to combat this form of political corruption was to promote the idea of 
universal manhood suffrage.  Yoshino had written on how limited suffrage was the root cause for 
political corruption: 
If the suffrage is limited, corruption will be rampant.  When the suffrage is 
extended as far as possible, there can be absolutely no distribution of bribes and 
the like.  More over, only when it has become absolutely impossible for 
candidates to fight one another with money and things of value will they compete 
by sincerely and frankly presenting their views and personal qualifications to the 
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people.  Consequently, the people will have an opportunity of receiving a political 
education through this means.
74
 
Realizing that many within his audience would not have been able to fully comprehend what 
universal manhood suffrage would entail, or that they simply misunderstood it as a political 
concept, Yoshino wrote further on the issue: “If we do not dispel this misunderstanding of 
universal suffrage and instill in the people the deep, heartfelt conviction that constitutional 
government cannot possibly develop properly unless universal suffrage is adopted, then the 
prospects for constitutional government are indeed gloomy.”
75
   
 By extending the right to vote to all males, Yoshino was accomplishing three goals.  
First, while the concept of constitutional government had been established by the Meiji 
Constitution, it was still relatively weak as a political institution.  By promoting universal 
suffrage, Yoshino was helping to solidify the concept of constitutional government into the 
Japanese mindset.  Secondly, and as was mentioned above, Yoshino clearly felt that the only way 
to combat political corruption was to extend the right to vote to a larger electorate.  If there was 
more people involved, politicians would not be able to disperse their funds effectively.  The third 
and final goal was to ensure that a much wider section of the Japanese populace would not only 
have a political voice by voting, but would also receive a political education, since the newly 
enfranchised would be partaking in the political process. 
 While the concept of minponshugi may at first seem strange to Westerners (who think of 
democracy in terms of popular sovereignty), one must remember that the concept of 
constitutional government was a foreign idea imposed on the Japanese by the Meiji oligarchy.  
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When developing the concept of minponshugi, however, Yoshino was undoubtedly looking to 
and influenced by Japanese tradition.  The most influential tradition that influenced Yoshino was 
the ideal of filial piety; and this can be seen with Yoshino’s usage of the phrase “for the general 
welfare of the people.”
76
  Yoshino was primarily active during the Taishō years, and must have 
been exceptionally pleased to see universal manhood suffrage passed in 1925 by the Kenseikai 
cabinet of Katō Komei.  As can be seen from his writings, Yoshino was firm in the belief that 
constitutional government was to be the future of Japan.  An early death on 18 March 1933 saved 
Yoshino from having to witness the violent years of Emperor Shōwa’s reign and being 
disappointed in the direction that the Empire of Japan would ultimately take. 
 
The Origins of Japanese Fascism 
 
 Before becoming renowned as the infamous right wing ultranationalist of the 1930s, Kita 
Ikki (1884 – 1937) started out as a Socialist.  Kita was introduced to socialism while he was 
taking courses as a student at Waseda University.  Upon hearing of the outbreak of the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911, Kita travelled to China and worked as a correspondent.  After returning to 
Japan, Kita assisted the renowned Japanese economist Abe Isoo (1865 – 1949) in creating the 
Social Democratic Party.  Following the creation of the Social Democratic Party, the Japanese 
Communist Party was founded in 1922.  In order to stem the outburst of Socialist political 
activity, the genrō, in conjunction with various cabinets of the Meiji and Taishō periods, 
continuously strengthened the Peace Police Law of 1900.  The constant renovation of this single 
law made it impossible for Socialists to function as a political movement.  Perhaps as a result of 
the inability to grow, Kita decided to leave the Socialist movement and became an 
                                                          
76Since the electorate had voted the government into power, it was the government’s responsibility to take care of 
the electorate. 
45 
 
ultranationalist.  By 1925, Kita had joined the Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society) and was an 
ardent supporter of kokutai (or Cardinal Principles of Our “National Polity”).  Kita revealed his 
new political ideology in a book that was known as Kokka Kaizō Hōan Daikō, or “An Outline 
Plan for the Reorganization of Japan,” which was published in 1923. 
 After abandoning socialism and becoming an ultranationalist in the early 1920s, Kita Ikki 
began refashioning his own political ideology.  One of the cornerstones of Kita’s new ideology 
was centered on the Emperor and his relationship with the Japanese people.  Kita wrote: “In 
order for the emperor and the entire Japanese people to establish a secure base for the national 
reorganization, the emperor will, by a show of his imperial prerogative, suspend the constitution 
for a period of three years, dissolve both houses of the Diet, and place the entire nation under 
martial law.”
77
  Without hesitation, Kita then goes on to say why such drastic actions need to be 
undertaken: 
The reason why the Diet must be dissolved is that the nobility and the wealthy on 
whom it depends are incapable of standing with the emperor and the people in the 
cause of reorganization.  The necessity for suspension of the constitution is that 
the people seek the protection in the codes enacted under it.  The reason that 
martial law must be proclaimed is that it is essential to the freedom of the nation 
that there be no restraint in suppressing the opposition that will come from these 
groups.
78
 
In addition to the suspension of all democratic institutions with which Kita had a distaste for, 
Kita was prepared to abolish the Peerage Law of 1884 so that “. . . .the spirit of the Meiji 
Restoration will be clarified by removing the barrier that has come between the emperor and the 
people.”  For Kita, the emperor had a dual role in Japanese society; the first was to act as the sole 
undisputed ruler of Japan.  The second was to act as the chief representative of the people. 
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 The second cornerstone of Kita’s new political ideology was concerned with the concept 
of the kokutai.  As mentioned in in chapter 2, the principle of kokutai was originally promoted 
by the genrō in order to serve as a basis for Japanese nationalism.  It was composed of a 
multitude of Japanese traditions which ranged from the slogan of “revere the emperor, and repel 
the barbarians” to the Confucian principal of filial piety.  While it was written in 1937, Kokutai 
No Hongi, or the “Fundamentals of Our National Polity” was a book written by the Ministry of 
Education that attempted to clarify the concept of kokutai further: 
Loyalty means to revere the emperor as [our] pivot and to follow him implicitly.  
By implicit obedience is meant casting ourselves aside and serving the emperor 
intently.  To walk this Way of loyalty is the sole Way in which we subjects may 
“live” and the fountainhead of all energy. . . . In our country, filial piety is a Way 
of the highest importance.  Filial piety originates with one’s family as its basis 
and, in its larger sense, has the nation as its foundation.  The direct object of filial 
piety is one’s parents, but in its relationship with the emperor finds a place within 
loyalty.
79
 
As can be seen from this, Kita was strongly influenced by the concept of kokutai when 
developing his new political ideology.  Due to the importance with which Kita stressed the 
concept of kokutai, one can see how he can be considered the father of Japanese fascism. 
 The reforms that Kita thus proposed would have virtually destroyed the political system 
that had been created by the genrō, replacing it with a system based solely on imperial 
sovereignty.  Kita was not kind in his criticism of the genrō, and had even written that: “Modern 
Japan is a medieval state mixing East and West, joining a decayed trunk to a rotten root.  Worms 
breed in a corpse, and the plump worms oozing from the corpse of the restoration revolution are 
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the so-called genrō.”
80
  In his final analysis of political systems, Kita sharply criticized the West 
for its espousal of constitutionalism: “There is no basis whatsoever for the belief of the 
democracies that a state governed by representatives voted in by the electorate is superior to a 
state with a system of government by a particular person.  Every nation has its own national 
spirit and history. . . .”
81
  After establishing the basis for his political ideology, Kita realized that 
he needed to state how one should go about in establishing his ideology as the basis of a new 
political order.  Kita wrote that: 
A coup d’état should be regarded as a direct manifestation of the authority of the 
nation, that is, of the will of society.  All the progressive leaders have arisen from 
popular groups.  They arise because of political leaders like Napoleon and Lenin.  
In the reorganization of Japan there must be a manifestation of the power inherent 
in a coalition of the people and sovereign.
82
   
With this, it can be seen that Kita had been deeply influenced by not only political revolutions in 
the past, but by the principle of kokutai.  For Kita, the principle of kokutai is what made Japan 
unique among nations. 
 After having analyzed Kita’s ideology, one can clearly see that Kita was attempting to 
reconstruct Japanese society in such a way that the Japanese public would have been in complete 
subservience to the state.  This new political system would give the state unrivaled authority and 
power over its citizenry, a key aspect of fascist ideology.  As can be seen from the samples used 
above, Kita’s writing was radical, and because of this, his books were banned.  As a result of this 
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censorship, Kita’s works were only known to a few, and he was eventually forgotten.
83
  Towards 
the latter years of his life, Kita disassociated himself with politics entirely, and became a devout 
follower of Nichiren Buddhism.  On 19 August 1937, Kita was executed by the Imperial 
Japanese Army on grounds that he had inspired the Two Twenty-six Incident, a coup d’état that 
failed to establish a Shōwa Restoration on 2 February 1936. 
 
The Final Taishō Years 
 
 The Seiyūkai was devastated by the assassination of Hara in 1921.  As the third president 
of the Seiyūkai, Hara offered the political party leadership abilities that were equivalent to Itō 
Hirobumi, who was the first president of the Seiyūkai, and Prince Saionji, who was the second 
president of the Seiyūkai.  Following the death of Hara, the power of the Seiyūkai steadily 
decreased as it fell under the leadership of Takahashi Korekiyo (1854 – 1936), who had served 
as Minister of Finance under the Hara cabinet.  Takahashi accepted the nomination to the 
position of prime minister from the genrō on 13 November 1921.  Lacking Hara’s ability in 
leadership, the cabinet that Takahashi had organized quickly fell apart as its members began to 
fight amongst each other over financial policies regarding the economy.  Unable to maintain 
unity within his own administration, Takahashi submitted his resignation to the genrō.  Rather 
than appoint another Seiyūkai member as prime minister, and knowing that the Seiyūkai was 
slowly collapsing, the genrō decided to nominate an admiral from the Imperial Japanese Navy as 
prime minister instead. 
 On 12 June 1922, Admiral Katō Tomosaburō accepted the nomination to become the next 
prime minister.  When forming his cabinet, Admiral Katō took the unusual step of selecting 
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members from the House of Peers.  By selecting members from the House of Peers rather than 
from the House of Representatives, Admiral Katō was clearly trying to distance himself from 
both the Kenseikai and Seiyūkai.  Before being able to achieve anything worthy of note, Admiral 
Katō died of natural causes on 24 August 1923.  In order to replace Admiral Kato, the genrō 
decided to draw upon the Imperial Japanese Navy again, and nominated former Prime Minister 
Yamamoto Gonnohyoe to the position of prime minister once again.  In showing their 
displeasure with the choice of nominating another non-party prime minister, Takahashi 
Korekiyo, and Katō Komei refused to offer any support to the new cabinet.  And just as Admiral 
Yamamoto was completing the process of organizing his cabinet, the Great Kanto Earthquake 
struck on 1 September 1923, straining the economy within the region of Tokyo.  In an attempt to 
show some political acumen, Prime Minister Yamamoto attempted to draft a bill which would 
have passed universal manhood suffrage.  This was met by resistance by the Seiyūkai, which 
wanted to use the passage of such a bill as a political tool.  Then, on 27 December 1927, an 
assassination plot against the Prince Regent was foiled.  Before any motion of no-confidence 
could be passed within the Imperial Diet, Admiral Yamamoto offered to submit his resignation. 
 Still dissatisfied with the behavior and performance of the Seiyūkai as the dominant 
political party, the genrō decided to go forth and nominate another non-party prime minister.  
Rather than nominate another member of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the genrō reverted back to 
the stock of personnel that Yamagata Aritomo had built around himself before his death, and 
decided to nominate Kiyoura Keigo (1850 – 1942) to the position of prime minister.  In direct 
response to Kiyoura’s nomination, the Seiyūkai and Kenseikai agreed to a temporary alliance and 
launched the Second Protect the Constitutional Movement.  Displeased with Takahashi’s 
decision to join the Kenseikai in opposition to the Kiyoura cabinet, Takejirō Tokonami (1866 – 
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1935) and over half of the Seiyūkai decided to defect from the party and formed the Rikken 
Seiyūhontō (Seiyū Main Party).  Despite this obvious weakening of the Seiyūkai, the Second 
Protect the Constitution Movement remained strong in large part due to the Kenseikai.  Faced 
with strong political opposition to his nomination, and an inability to form a cabinet, Kiyoura 
decided to submit his resignation on 11 June 1924. 
 Following the collapse of the Ōkuma cabinet and the reorganization of the Dōshikai into 
the Kenseikai, Katō Komei, the president of the Kenseikai began an unrelenting campaign of 
hostility against the genrō.  Bitter over how the genrō ended the one and only Dōshikai cabinet, 
Katō sharply criticized the genrō and had often stated that: “a small group of men. . . .ought not 
have rights greater than those of other Japanese because they are from Chōshū.”
84
  This 
campaign eventually culminated into the Second Protect the Constitution Movement and the 
ousting of Kiyoura from the position of prime minister.  Following the splintering of the Seiyūkai 
into two halves, the Kiyoura cabinet called for a general election in which the Kenseikai became 
the dominant political party.  Knowing that the country was monitoring political developments 
due to the Second Protect the Constitution Movement, the genrō decided to nominate Katō 
Komei as prime minister.  Katō accepted the nomination and became prime minister on 11 June 
1924. 
 Immediately following his nomination to the position of prime minister, Katō formed a 
cabinet that was composed of Kenseikai members.  In order to avoid any political repercussions 
that might be handed out to the cabinet by the Second Protect the Constitutional Movement for 
not having enacted any kind of reforms, the Katō, cabinet with support from the Seiyūhontō 
passed an electoral reform law in 1925.  The first part of this law introduced universal suffrage 
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for all males over 25 years old.  The second part addressed the electoral districting that had been 
undertaken during Hara’s Seiyūkai administration.  While many praised the Katō cabinet for 
having finally passed universal suffrage, many cursed it for having passed the Peace Preservation 
Law of 1925 soon afterwards.  Like its predecessor the Peace Police Law of 1900, the Peace 
Preservation Law of 1925 targeted the activities of Anarchists, Communists, and Socialists by 
restricting their movements with stringent regulations and ensuring harsh penalties for those 
convicted of such radical activity.  Unlike the previous reforms that had been carried out to 
strengthen the Peace Police Law of 1900, the Katō cabinet probably realized that an upgrade of 
that law was needed, and the cabinet decided to take the initiative.
85
  Just as with Hara’s 1918 – 
1921 tenure as Prime Minister, Katō’s was the highlight of his political career.  These two years 
of near constant political activity must have been exceptionally tiring to Katō, for the prime 
minister would die of natural causes on 28 January 1926. 
 Since 1922, Meiji’s grandson Shōwa had been acting as Prince Regent for the sickly 
Emperor Taishō.  On 25 December 1925, Emperor Taishō died of natural causes, resulting in the 
Prince Regent ascending to the throne and becoming Emperor Shōwa.  While the genrō did their 
best to ensure that Emperor Taishō could perform as nominal sovereign by appointing imperial 
advisors to assist him, the mental health of Emperor Taishō proved to be a challenge.  During the 
Taishō period, the mainstream political parties continued to act as disruptive entities in the lower 
House of Representatives, and the genrō utilized them as they saw fit.  Their ability to evolve 
into new political parties undoubtedly helped to ensure their overall longevity and continued 
usefulness.  The gradual weakening of the influence and power that the genrō had held over the 
political system since its creation also greatly affected Taishō period politics.  Having lived 
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through much of the Meiji period, the genrō were reaching old age, and a natural outcome of 
reaching old age was death.  By 1924, Prince Saionji was the last of the genrō, and he was 
preparing Prince Konoe and other economic / political leaders for the newly created position of 
jūshin, or Senior Statesmen.  For much of the Taishō period the country was relatively stable, as 
has been seen however, the inauguration of a new monarch is often fraught with instability, and 
the early Shōwa period was no exception. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Ascension of the Military (1926 – 1941) 
 
 On 28 January 1926, the Kenseikai president and Prime Minister, Katō Komei, died of 
natural causes.  Wakatsuki Reijirō (1866 – 1949), who had been a member of the Kenseikai since 
its founding, succeeded Katō as party president.  After becoming the president of the Kenseikai, 
Wakatsuki was then nominated to the position of prime minister by Prince Saionji.  Following 
the death of Emperor Taishō on 25 December 1926, Prince Regent Shōwa ascended to the 
imperial throne and became Emperor.  The continued use of a major political party member as 
prime minister seemed to portend a bright future for constitutional government in Japan.  As will 
be seen however, an upsurge of ultranationalist activities and societies during the early Shōwa 
period would greatly effect the future prospects of constitutional government in Japan.  In 
addition to this, Prince Saionji had become the last of the genrō, and he began to lead as well as 
prepare a new generation of economic and political leaders who would eventually become 
known as Jūshin or Senior Statesmen. 
 While acting as prime minister, Wakatsuki utilized a tentative alliance between the 
Kenseikai and Seiyūhonto in order to control the lower house of the Imperial Diet.  In the area of 
foreign affairs, Prime Minister Wakatsuki attempted to orchestrate a rapprochement with China 
by abandoning imperialist policy on the continent.
86
  This shift in foreign policy not only angered 
the military, but also the Seiyūkai, which began to support imperialist policies as part of its 
political ideology.  It would be in the area of domestic affairs that the Wakatsuki cabinet would 
eventually falter, and then collapse.  Ever since becoming a part of the Empire of Japan after the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894 – 95, the island of Formosa (Taiwan) had been treated as a colony by 
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the Japanese.  It was settled by Japan, and what natural resources it had to offer were exploited.  
In order to finance more development on the island, the Bank of Taiwan had been established 
shortly after the island had been incorporated into the empire.  By 1926, the Bank of Taiwan was 
experiencing a financial crisis and had to appeal to the Bank of Japan for relief. 
 The Bank of Japan refused to issue that relief in the form of additional yen to the Bank of 
Taiwan, which resulted in the closing of several banks on the island.  Fearing that a much larger 
financial crisis would ensue if it did not act promptly, the Wakatsuki cabinet decided to take 
direct action and passed a bill which forced the Bank of Japan to send relief.  The lower House of 
Representatives was not in session, and when word of what the Wakatsuki cabinet had done 
spread, outrage ensued.  The Privy Council reviewed the situation, and then ordered the 
Wakatsuki cabinet to abolish the bill and pass a new one through the lower House of 
Representatives.  Its alliance with the Seiyūhonto would have allowed the Kenseikai to pass any 
bill in the lower House of Representatives.  Despite this, the Wakatsuki cabinet chose to resign 
instead.
87
  Following the departure of Wakatsuki from the position of prime minister in the 
spring of 1927, the Kenseikai and Seiyūhonto decided to merge together and form a new political 
party.  That political party was established on 1 June 1927 and was known as the Rikken 
Minseitō (Constitutional Democratic Party). 
 Following the collapse of the Wakatsuki cabinet, Prince Saionji decided to nominate a a 
member of the Seiyūkai to the position of prime minister.  The Seiyūkai was severely weakened 
when several of its members chose to leave the political party to form the Seiyūhonto.  Prince 
Saionji obviously hoped that the nomination of a Seiyūkai member to the position of prime 
minister would restore the Seiyūkai as a major political force once again.  The eventual 
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nomination was awarded to the Seiyūkai president and a former general in the Imperial Japanese 
Army, Tanaka Giichi (1864 – 1929).  Soon after forming his cabinet, Prime Minister Tanaka 
called for a general election.  Those elections were held on 20 February 1928, and neither the 
Seiyūkai nor the Minseitō won a majority; it was in fact deadlocked in the lower House of 
Representatives. 
 In order to end the financial crisis that had begun under the Wakatsuki cabinet, Prime 
Minister Tanaka had the Imperial Diet pass an economic relief bill that forced the Bank of Japan 
to issue a large sum of yen to the Bank of Taiwan.  After successfully resolving the financial 
crisis with the Bank of Taiwan, the Tanaka cabinet continued to concentrate on domestic reforms 
by passing an amendment for the Peace Preservation Law with a provision that allowed any 
persons convicted of Anarchist-Socialist activity to be sentenced to death.  The second major 
issue that the Tanaka cabinet dealt with was election reform.  The electoral system was modified 
in such a way by the Tanaka cabinet that the Seiyūkai was guaranteed a major victory in the next 
general election should one be held.  However, the first serious blow to land on the Tanaka 
cabinet was in the area of foreign affairs; since its formation, the Tanaka cabinet had 
concentrated primarily on domestic affairs, an inability and incompetency when dealing with 
foreign affairs eventually caused the collapse of the Tanaka cabinet.  The Tanaka cabinet sparked 
outrage when it took part in the conference and signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact.  While the 
pacifist nature of the pact was controversial in its own right, the fact that the cabinet had 
superseded one of the emperor’s imperial prerogatives was the larger issue.
88
  Emperor Shōwa 
eventually had the Privy Council review the pact.  After careful review, the Privy Council 
decided to ratify the pact with the addition of the phrase “inapplicable in so far as Japan is 
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concerned.”
89
  This simple phrase would make it possible for Japan to abandon the pact in the 
future if a situation required the nation to do so. 
 
The Manchurian Incident and the End of Party Prime Ministers 
 
 After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 – 05, the Japanese had won certain economic and 
political rights from the Russians in Manchuria.  In an effort to appease his own outspoken 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mori Kaku (1883 – 1932), as well as the militarists within the 
Imperial Japanese Army, Prime Minister Tanaka adopted an interventionist policy towards 
China.
90
  This interventionist policy involved sending troops into China and protecting Japanese 
citizens stationed across the open port cities along the Chinese coast.  In addition to this, the 
Japanese were primarily concerned with the area of northern China that was known as 
Manchuria and protecting those economic and political rights that had been obtained from the 
Russians.  Problems began to arise for the Japanese in the region when the Guomindang 
(Nationalist Party), under General Chiang Kai-shek, began the process of unifying China after 
launching a campaign that was known as the Northern Expedition in 1926.
91
  General Chiang 
Kai-shek and the Guomindang quickly defeated the warlords in central China within a year, and 
declared Nanjing the new Chinese capital.  At the beginning of 1928, Guomindang forces began 
to push northwards towards Beijing and clashed with Manchurian forces under the control of 
warlord Zhang Zuolin (1875 – 1928). 
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 For some time the Kwantung Army had been influenced by ultranationalist ideology.  
While led by men such as Colonel Doihara Kenji and Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, the 
Kwantung Army became a hotbed of ultranationalist ideology.  In an effort to gain more 
influence in Manchuria, the ultranationalists that were within the Kwantung Army decided that it 
was time to rid themselves of the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin and replace him with his 
own son, Zhang Xueliang.  During the summer of 1928, while on his way back into Manchuria 
from Beijing, the train that was transporting the elder Zhang was blown up.  The assassination of 
Zhang Zuolin caused quite a commotion in Japan; primarily because it was widely believed that 
the assassination had been carried out by the Kwantung Army.  Upon learning of the 
assassination of the Manchurian warlord, Prime Minister Tanaka is reported to have yelled out: 
“What fools!  They [the Kwantung Army] behave like children.  They have no idea what the 
parent has to go through.”
92
 
 As a former general in the Imperial Japanese Army, much more was expected of Prime 
Minister Tanaka in regards to maintaining control and discipline over the military.  An imperial 
audience was eventually held in which the Prime Minister and the Emperor met to discuss the 
incident.  In order to regain some composure and favor, Prime Minister Tanaka promised 
Emperor Shōwa to investigate the incident and punish those officers and men that were believed 
to be involved in the incident.  Within a few days it was revealed during a second audience with 
Emperor Shōwa that Prime Minister Tanaka had not carried through with his promise.  Emperor 
Shōwa then proceeded to brow beat Tanaka and ended the audience before the Prime Minister 
could defend himself.  Disgraced, embarrassed, and clearly out of favor, Prime Minister Tanaka 
had no choice but to submit his resignation, which he did on 2 July 1929. 
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 Knowing that the Seiyūkai was in trouble internally and publicly, the jūshin decided to 
nominate the Minseitō president Hamaguchi Osachi to the position of prime minister.  Within 
hours of Tanaka submitting his resignation, Hamaguchi accepted the offer and assembled a 
cabinet based solely on Minseitō members.  The primary goal of the Hamaguchi cabinet was to 
strengthen the overall economy.
93
  This was achieved by enacting a series of cuts that affected 
both the civilian and the military.  Towards the end of 1929, the Minseitō cabinet decided to have 
Japan return to the gold standard.  It was believed that this would further strengthen the economy 
and make the yen equivalent to most of the Western currencies.  The collapse of the Minseitō 
cabinet of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi began on 14 November 1930, when Prime Minister 
Hamaguchi was fatally shot by an ultranationalist who attempted to assassinate the Prime 
Minister.  Due to the severity of the wounds that the Prime Minister received, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Shidehara Kijūrō, acted as Prime Minister for several months.  The final nail in 
the coffin for the Hamaguchi cabinet was the devastating economic effects of the Great 
Depression, which arrived on Japanese shores in late 1930.  On 26 August 1931, Prime Minister 
Hamaguchi succumbed to his wounds and died.  Following the death of Prime Minister 
Hamaguchi, the jūshin decided to give Wakatsuki Reijirō a second chance at being prime 
minister.  Wakatsuki had been a leading member of the Minseitō since its formation in the 
summer of 1928, and upon accepting the nomination to the position of Prime Minister, 
Wakatsuki established a cabinet based solely of Minseitō members.  Despite having achieved a 
second chance at the position of prime minister, Wakatsuki’s second tenure would be as 
lackluster as his first. 
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 Following the creation of the Wakatsuki cabinet, the region of Manchuria became of 
great interest to the ultranationalists within the Kwantung Army.  The problem revolved 
primarily around the young Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang, who now commanded his 
father’s forces.  Zhang came under the sway of Chinese nationalism shortly after General Chiang 
Kai-shek established control over a large swathe of territory in central China and declared 
Nanjing the new Chinese capital.  Colonel Doihara Kenji, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, 
and Major-General Itagaki Seishirō began to worry that Zhang would eventually unite 
Manchuria with the Guomindang regime that was based on Nanjing.  In early 1931, Lieutenant 
Colonel Ishiwara organized a conference that studied the region intensively in order to come up 
with a possible solution to the “Manchurian Problem.”  A stream of anti-Japanese activities 
occurred throughout China during the spring of 1931, angering the ultranationalists so much that 
after weeks of somber deliberation amongst the members of the conference, it was finally 
decided that if the situation continued to deteriorate, then an actual invasion would be necessary 
to secure the region.
94
  September 28, 1931 was established as a tentative date for an invasion. 
 During the early hours of 18 September 1931, men from a battalion of the Kwantung 
Army (that was stationed for security in Mukden) sabotaged a section of the South Manchurian 
Railway by planting explosives and blowing up a small section of rail.  The Japanese officers 
that were present in the region reported the incident as the result of Chinese banditry in the 
region and took action against the Chinese garrison in Mukden.
95
  Upon learning of the fighting 
that had taken place in Mukden, Lieutenant Colonel Itagaki Seishirō, who was stationed in the 
Kwantung Army’s headquarters at Port Arthur, ordered reinforcements from the main Kwantung 
                                                          
94See Montgomery, Imperialist Japan, 302. 
 
95Ibid, 309 - 310. 
60 
 
Army that was stationed in Korea to cross the Yalu River and to support the battalions that were 
already stationed in Manchuria.  On 19 September 1931, the commander of the Korean Army 
General Hayashi Senjūrō ordered his troops to mobilize and cross the Yalu River in order to 
support the Kwantung Army and to help further its advance.  When news of the invasion of 
Manchuria reached Tokyo on 19 September 1931, there was little that the Wakatsuki cabinet 
could do.  Despite having issued a censorship on the press about the incident, word of what had 
transpired in Manchuria eventually reached the general public.  An inability to effectively deal 
with the incident eventually led to the collapse of the second Wakatsuki cabinet in early 
December 1931. 
 Having been devastated by the twin crises of the Great Depression and the Manchurian 
Incident, the jūshin decided that the Minseitō was undeserving for a third chance at the position 
of prime minister.  Despite its recent setbacks during the previous decade, the Seiyūkai was 
experiencing a major resurgence.  This resurgence was largely due to the Seiyūkai’s new 
president Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855 – 1932).  The jūshin decided to nominate Inukai to the position 
of prime minister, which Inukai accepted on 13 December 1931.  After accepting the 
nomination, Prime Minister Inukai immediately began establishing a cabinet based solely on 
Seiyūkai members.  In order to show his determination to solve Japan’s economic problems, 
Inukai’s first move as prime minister was to appoint political veteran and longtime Seiyūkai 
member Takahashi Korekiyo as Minister of Finance.  At the same time, Prime Minister Inukai 
attempted to appease the ultranationalists by appointing General Araki Sadao to the position of 
Minister of the Army. 
 In order to halt the devastating effects of the Great Depression on the Japanese economy, 
Minister of Finance Takahashi began to reverse the economic policies that had been undertaken 
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by the Minseitō cabinets of Hamaguchi and Wakatsuki.  This included an embargo on gold, 
which prevented individuals from either buying or selling the precious metal.  Once it was 
determined that no more specie was entering or leaving Japan, Takahashi ordered Japan to leave 
the gold standard.
96
  In addition to this, Takahashi began a policy which essentially devalued the 
yen, causing it to be closer to the market price of other Western currencies.  Following his 
appointment to the position of Minister of the Army, General Araki ordered additional 
reinforcements to the Kwantung and Korean Armies so that the two forces could continue with 
their occupation of Manchuria.  By the outset of February 1932, the whole of Manchuria had 
been seized from Chinese control.  On 15 May 1932, while waiting for a train in Tokyo, Prime 
Minister Inukai was assassinated by members of the Ketsumeidan (or Blood Pledge Corps) a 
secretive organization which was led by the Nichiren Buddhist priest Innoue Nisshō.  This 
ultranationalist society had come to believe that Prime Minister Inukai was holding back the 
Kwantung Army from achieving its objectives in northern China, and so decided to permanently 
remove the impediment that the prime minister posed to further conquest in the region. 
 
The Seminal Naval Years and Army Factionalism 
 
 The assassination of the Seiyūkai Prime Minister Inukai on 15 May 1932 spelled doom 
for any future prospects of political party members becoming prime ministers.  It was at this 
important juncture in Japanese history when the jūshin lost faith in the political parties and after 
careful deliberation, decided that only the military seemed capable of providing the steadfast 
leadership that was called for in times of crisis.  With approval from Prince Saionji, the jūshin 
nominated retired admiral Saitō Makoto (1858 – 1936) to the position of prime minister.  The 
former admiral accepted the nomination and became the new Japanese prime minister on 26 May 
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1932.  In order to avoid a political battle with the Minseitō and Seiyūkai, Prime Minister Saitō 
invited both parties to join his cabinet.  .
97
  The primary goal in forming a national unity cabinet 
was to solve the issue of partisanship by granting all involved in government a position within 
the new cabinet. 
 The unprecedented composition of the Saitō cabinet led to an aura of anticipation for the 
new cabinet.  In the area of domestic affairs, the Saitō cabinet passed a comprehensive economic 
program that saw the expansion of the budget.  This enabled the building and renovation of 
public works that ranged from railways to ports.  In the area of foreign affairs, the Saitō cabinet 
extended diplomatic recognition to Manchukuo, a new state that was established in September of 
1932 by the Kwantung Army.  In order to further legitimize their new state, the Kwantung Army 
decided to utilize the last Qing emperor, Aisin-Gioro, as the head of state.  After ascending to the 
throne of Manchukuo, Aisin-Gioro was rechristened with a new posthumous title of Kangde, but 
was better known in the West as Henry Puyi.  On 27 March 1933, Japan decided to leave the 
League of Nations after that assembly had adopted the Lytton Commission’s report, which 
criticized Japan’s seizure of Manchuria.  In an attempt to give Manchukuo security, Japanese 
officials began to negotiate with their Chinese counterparts over the issue of Manchukuo’s 
borders.  What resulted from these negotiations was the Tanggu Truce of 31 May 1933.  The 
Tanggu Truce stipulated that a cease-fire between China and Japan would follow suit once 
Chinese forces had withdrawn troops some forty miles from the Tienstin-Beijing railway line.  
Tensions between the Republic of China and Japan were once again increasing. 
 As with the Yamamoto cabinet of 1913 – 14, the Saitō cabinet was brought down by a 
financial scandal.  Following the announcement of this financial scandal, the Saitō cabinet 
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decided to resign.  Prince Saionji and the other jūshin decided to nominate another ex-Admiral 
from the Imperial Japanese Navy to the position of prime minister.  On 8 July 1934, Okada 
Keisuke (1868 – 1952) accepted the nomination to become Japan’s new prime minister, and like 
Saitō, Prime Minister Okada formed a national unity cabinet.  During summer of 1935, the 
Kwantung Army succeeded in acquiring two additional agreements from Guomindang officials 
in northern China.  The first agreement was signed on 10 June 1935 and was known as the He-
Umezu Agreement.  The He-Umezu Agreement forced the Guomindang to suspend all military 
and political activities within Hebei province (which contained the city of Beijing).  The second 
agreement was signed on 27 June 1935 and was known as the Qin-Doihara Agreement.  As with 
the He-Umezu Agreement, the Qin-Doihara Agreement forced the Guomindang to suspend all 
military and political activities within Chahar province, which was west of Manchukuo.  These 
agreements further solidified Manchukuo’s southern and western borders offering the newly 
created state some measure of security. 
 Lack of respect for the civilian government in Tokyo would continue to grow within the 
ranks of the Imperial Japanese Army well into the mid-1930s.  At the outset of 1936, several 
mid-level officers from the First Division, a unit that was stationed for garrison duty in Tokyo, 
were planning to carry out a coup d’etat against the cabinet of Prime Minister Okada.  The 
General’s Staff had actually planned to transfer the First Division to Manchuria at the end of the 
month, and this may have prompted the officers to speed up their plans.
98
  The primary goal for 
these officers was to establish a “Shōwa Restoration,” a term that had been utilized by renowned 
ultranationalist Kita Ikki.  Some 1,500 men from the division, along with some civilian 
ultranationalists planned to seize the government district and assassinate every member of the 
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Okada cabinet.  After removing the cabinet and seizing the government district, the leaders of the 
coup would establish their own cabinet and appoint advisers whom they thought would serve the 
Emperor better. 
 The coup d’état was launched on 26 February 1936, and after seizing control of much of 
the government district, the officers and men of the First Division carried out successful 
assassinations of Lord Privy Seal Saitō, Minister of Finance Takahashi, and the inspector-general 
of military education.  Moments before the assassins reached the residence of the prime minister, 
Okada’s wife hid him away in a closet.  When the assassins stormed the Okada residence they 
mistakenly gunned down Okada’s brother.  From the outset of the coup, Emperor Shōwa was 
greatly displeased with the actions of the rebels: “I deeply regret that they have murdered my 
most loyal and trusted ministers. . . . They are trying to pull a silk rope around my neck.  What 
they did violated both the constitution and the rescripts of the Meiji emperor.  I shall never 
forgive them, no matter what their motives are.”
99
  During a counsel with the Minister of War, 
Emperor Shōwa is reported to have said: “This is mutiny. . . . I will give you one hour in which 
to suppress the rebels.  Any soldier who moves Imperial troops without my orders is not my 
soldier, no matter what excuse he may have.”
100
  Later in the morning the Imperial Japanese 
Navy had discovered that ex-Admiral Saitō had been ruthlessly murdered in Tokyo, this 
prompted it to redeploy the First Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy which numbered some 40 
battleships in Tokyo Bay and land marines in order to put down the rebellion. 
 While the Emperor was stalwart in his opposition to the coup, it took the General’s Staff 
two days to issue reinforcements to Tokyo and to order those units to put down the rebels.  Some 
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members of the General’s Staff may have intentionally dragged their feet in order to bide the 
rebels more time to achieve their goals and ensure the success of the coup.  By the 29 February 
1936, however, with artillery and tanks surrounding their positions, it became clear to even 
mutual observers like Ishiwara Kanji that the cause of the rebels was lost.  Upon surrendering, 
many of the mid-level officers chose to commit hara-kiri (or self-sacrifice) rather than face a 
court martial, and then a firing squad.  A military court was established on the 30 February 1930 
by the Emperor himself, and several officers along with renowned ultranationalist Kita Ikki were 
found guilty of treason and sentenced to execution.  The failure of the coup d’état had a profound 
impact on the ultranationalist movement.  Never again would the ultranationalist movement 
attempt to change the economic, political or societal order of Japan through violence.  Another 
unexpected consequence of the Two Twenty-six Incident involved the jūshin, who as a group, 
would cease to play an active role in selecting potential nominees for the position of prime 
minister.  That responsibility would fall solely on the shoulders of Prince Saionji. 
 Upon being appointed to the position of Minister of the Army, General Araki Sadao 
began making transfers and forced retirements of men who were loyal to General Ugaki 
Kazushuge.  This reprisal was in response to General Ugaki’s refusal to support two proposed 
coup d’états that had been planned to be carried out by General Araki in March and October 
1931.  While ultra-nationalism was strong among the officers and men of the Imperial Japanese 
Army; another potent force that was rife within the army was factionalism.  During the early 
Shōwa period there were two major factions within the Imperial Japanese Army: these were the 
Kōdōhā or Imperial Way Faction which was led by General Araki Sadao and the Tōseiha or 
Control Faction which was led by General Ugaki Kazushige.  Both of these factions competed 
for top level positions within the government and the Imperial Japanese Army.  The infighting 
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between these two groups was made public. . . .  The influence with which the Imperial Way 
Faction and other ultranationalist societies had over the officers of the First Division who had 
initiated the coup on 26 February 1936, should not be overlooked.  When the coup collapsed, so 
did the Imperial Way Faction and its potent influence that it had over the government and the 
army.  The status quo returned to its former position as it was in the early 1930s, when both the 
Control and Imperial Way Factions competed for positions of power. 
 
An Era of Total War 
 
 Once the dust had settled from the Two Twenty-six Incident, Prince Saionji began 
seeking out men who could become Japan’s new prime minister and offer the necessary 
leadership that was needed to bring back not only stability, but discipline and order as well.  
Prince Saionji’s first choice was Prince Konoe Fumimaro.  Utilizing the excuse of ill health, 
Prince Konoe declined the nomination to become Japan’s new prime minister.  As a result of 
Prince Konoe’s refusal of the nomination, Prince Saionji turned to his second choice: Hirota 
Koki (1878 – 1948).  Before becoming prime minister, Hirota was a veteran politician who had 
acted as the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Saitō and Okada cabinets.  It was during this 
time that the Imperial Japanese Army exerted its influence over the government.  This was done 
by pressuring Prime Minister Hirota into enacting several cabinet level reforms that the army 
wanted.  The first of these involved the position of Home Minister.  In order to limit their 
influence over the internal development of Japan, the army decided that the position of Home 
Minister should not be occupied by any member that belonged to a political party. 
 Other reforms included the continued departmentalization of the government.  New 
departments included the Department of Railways (established in 1920) and Colonial Affairs 
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(established in 1928), both of which were organized under the Home Ministry.
101
  Following 
these reforms, Prime Minister Hirota, with approval from the army, dissolved the Cabinet 
Deliberative Council and set up the Naikaku Chosakyoku (or Cabinet Research Bureau).  Largely 
composed of bureaucrats, this new political body sought to enact further administrative reform 
and the weakening of the Imperial Diet. 
 The army’s influence was not limited to just reforms within the government.  On 25 
November 1936, Japan and Nazi Germany signed a treaty that was known as the Anti-Comintern 
Pact.  The treaty stipulated that there should be joint cooperation between the two powers against 
the Soviet Union should it attack either nation.  Following the signing of the Anti-Comintern 
Pact, the Minister of the Army Terauchi Hisaichi (1879 – 1946) planned to pressure Prime 
Minister Hirota into enacting additional cabinet-level reforms.  Various members within the 
cabinet, as well as the prime minister himself saw no further reason for additional reforms.  
Unwilling to accept the cabinet’s decision, Minister of the Army Terauchi refused to cooperate 
with it, and on 23 January 1937, Hirota resigned from the position of prime minister. 
 Following Hirota’s resignation, Prince Saionji decided to nominate General Hayashi 
Senjūrō to the position of prime minister.  On 2 February 1937, General Hayashi accepted the 
nomination and became the new prime minister.  Like past army cabinets, Prime Minister 
Hayashi’s cabinet was not cordial towards the mainstream political parties.  In an attempt to 
ward off any political party threat, Prime Minister Hayashi decided to hold a general election 
with the hopes that it would weaken the political parties influence in the Imperial Diet.
102
  
Realizing his error only after the election was held, and facing criticism for having called a 
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general election from other generals within the army, Hayashi decided to resign from the 
position of prime minister on 4 June 1937.  Following Hayashi’s resignation, Prince Saionji 
decided to nominate Prince Konoe to the position of prime minister for a second time.  This time 
however, Prince Konoe accepted the nomination and became prime minister on 4 June 1937.  
Those that favored the “Strike North” strategy were very pleased when the Anti-Comintern Pact 
was signed in the fall of 1936 since it seemed to portend that Japan and the Soviet Union would 
eventually go to war.  Those strategists wanted a war between Japan and the Soviet Union so that 
Japan could protect the rest of East Asia from the spreading of communism. 
 In the fall of 1928, the Guomindang decided to name Nanjing the new Chinese capital in 
an attempt to consolidate its hold over central China, which it had seized from various warlords 
during the Northern Expedition of 1926 – 28.  At the outset of 1927, a schism occurred within 
the Guomindang when it decided to purge those members who belonged to the Chinese 
Communist Party from its ranks.
103
  In an attempt to rid themselves of the Communist threat, the 
Guomindang launched a series of Extermination Campaigns which forced the Chinese 
Communist Party to evacuate its base in Jiangxi province and establish a new base in the 
northerly province of Yenan.  In order to buy the Guomindang time to enact reforms that would 
strengthen the new regime, its leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, adopted a policy of 
appeasement towards the Japanese.  What resulted from this foreign policy was the Manchurian 
Incident of 1931, as well as the Tanggu Truce of 1933, the He-Umezu and Qin-Doihara 
Agreements of 1935 that further encroached upon Chinese sovereignty in the north.  As part of 
an effort to rebuild Sino-German relations in the early 1930s, Adolf Hitler dispatched a mission 
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which was composed of several advisers to assist the Guomindang in undertaking statewide 
reforms. 
 Towards the end of 1936, Chiang Kai-shek felt confident enough to launch another series 
of Extermination Campaigns that would end the threat of the Chinese Communist Party and 
ordered the former Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang to attack the Communists in Yenan.  
When it became clear that Zhang was reluctant to attack the Communists, Chiang personally 
went to Xi’an, a city south of Yenan where Zhang had established his base of operations after 
being forced out of Manchuria in 1931.  On 12 December 1936, the generalissimo arrived in 
Xi’an, and Zhang had Chiang placed under arrest.  The reason why Marshal Zhang ordered the 
arrest of the Generalissimo remains unclear.  It is more than likely however, that after having 
been forced out of his native Manchuria by the Japanese in 1931, Marshal Zhang had become 
greatly disgruntled with the policy of appeasement that Chiang had been using as his foreign 
policy.  It is also possible that Marshal Zhang had become influenced by the Chinese Communist 
Party, which had established a new base in the province of Yenan, which was just west of the 
city of Xi’an.  What resulted from this Xi’an Incident was an alliance between the Chinese 
Communist Party and the Guomindang that was known as the United Front.  In addition to this 
alliance, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to end his policy of appeasement towards the Japanese.  
Chiang Kai-shek was eventually released from his imprisonment on 25 December 1936 once the 
generalissimo had agreed to the above terms. 
 On 7 July 1937, Chinese and Japanese forces clashed near the Marco Polo Bridge in 
Beijing when Japanese troops entered the area to search for one of their own.  An attempt to 
bring about an end to the fighting by local military personnel failed when negotiations between 
the two sides became impossible when Chiang, in accordance with his acceptance of the terms at 
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Xi’an, refused to accept any of the Japanese proposals for peace.  Hostilities grew exponentially 
when both sides sent additional reinforcements to the city of Beijing.  By 13 August 1937, 
hostilities expanded southward to the port city of Shanghai when Chinese soldiers attacked 
Japanese marines that had been stationed in the city to protect Japanese citizens and trade.  
Immediately following this attack, Prince Konoe sent reinforcements to the city.  What resulted 
was the Battle of Shanghai, a four month long siege of the city that did not end until 26 
November 1937. 
104
 Following its victory at Shanghai, the Imperial Japanese Army marched 
northwards and laid siege to the Guomindang capital of Nanjing.  The capture of Nanjing on 13 
December 1937 seemed to portend the inevitability of Japanese victory.  To the disappointment 
of both military and political leaders in Tokyo, however, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek simply 
relocated the Guomindang capital to Wuhan, and then to Chongqing. 
 Throughout the following year of 1938, diplomatic missions were continuously sent to 
Chongqing by the Japanese but were ignored every time they were received at the new 
Guomindang capital.  When it became clear that negotiations would not occur between the two 
powers, Prince Konoe began to seek other ways to find peace in China.  On 3 November 1938, 
Prince Konoe announced that “What Japan seeks. . . . is the establishment of a new order that 
will insure the permanent stability of East Asia.  In this lies the ultimate purpose of our present 
military campaign.”
105
  A secondary goal for Japan was “to perfect the joint defense against 
Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East 
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Asia.”
106
  It was at this time when Wang Jingwei (1883 – 1944), a political ally to Chiang Kai-
shek within the Guomindang defected to the Japanese occupying Nanjing.  Throughout the 
remainder of 1938 and well into 1939, Wang would act independently as a mediator between the 
Japanese and Chiang, attempting to negotiate a peace.  Because of this service, and the fact that 
he was once a high ranking member of the Guomindang, the Japanese decided to promote Wang 
to the position of president of the “Reorganized” Government of the Republic of China on 30 
March 1940.  Unable to bring hostilities between China and Japan to an end, Prince Konoe 
decided to resign from the position of prime minister on 5 January 1939. 
 Before leaving the position of prime minister, Prince Konoe nominated Hiranuma 
Kiichirō (1867 – 19520) to be his replacement.  A member of the Privy Council for most of his 
political career, Hiranuma accepted the nomination soon after Prince Konoe had submitted his 
resignation.  Barely a year had lapsed into Prime Minister Hiranuma’s tenure when Tokyo 
received the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  Upon hearing of the non-aggression clause 
that was within the pact, Prime Minister Hiranuma was so beside himself with disbelief that he 
submitted his resignation on 30 August 1939.  Following Hiranuma’s announcement to resign 
from the position of prime minister, Prince Saionji decided to also submit his own resignation to 
Emperor Shōwa.  The departure of Prince Saionji, who was the last of the genrō, from political 
life was not unexpected, for he had aged greatly during the past several years.  After submitting 
his resignation, Prince Saionji had written that finding a potential nominee for the position of 
prime minister “is beyond me.  If there is anyone I thought would be better than another I would 
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speak up. . . .”
107
  Prior to leaving his position of genrō, Prince Saionji had been prepping Kido 
Kōichi (1889 – 1977), who was the grandson of Kido Takayoshi with the task of assisting 
Emperor Shōwa in nominating qualified individuals to the position of prime minister.  The jūshin 
were also re-established as an advisory committee after having been temporarily disbanded 
following the Two Twenty-six Incident. 
 After Hiranuma resigned from the position of prime minister, the Imperial Japanese 
Army took the initiative and nominated General Abe Nobuyuki (1875 – 1953) to become the 
new prime minister.  Kido and the jūshin accepted the army’s proposal, and General Abe became 
the new prime minister on 30 August 1939.  In an effort to stall the ever growing influence that 
the Imperial Japanese Army had over the government, Emperor Shōwa ordered Prime Minister 
Abe to choose from either Umezu Yoshijirō (1882 – 1949) or Hata Shunroku (1879 – 1962) as 
Minister of the Army.
108
  The Emperor wanted to avoid any further disciplinary issues within the 
army and both men had served exemplary on the front when hostilities broke out between China 
and Japan in 1937.  In addition to this, Prime Minister Abe was instructed by Emperor Shōwa to 
facilitate a diplomatic rapprochement with Great Britain and the United States.  Before being 
able to accomplish anything worthy of note, Prime Minister Abe was brought down by the 
Imperial Diet.  Sensing an opportunity to regain its lost influence over the government, the lower 
House of Representatives passed a motion of no-confidence on 26 December 1939.  Twelve days 
later, on 14 January 1940 and with additional pressure to resign stemming from the army, Prime 
Minister Abe submitted his resignation to the jūshin. 
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 Having tried an army general as prime minister, the jūshin decided to give the Imperial 
Japanese Navy a chance at the position of prime minister.  The individual that the jūshin chose to 
nominate to the position of prime minister was Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa (1880 – 1948), who 
had served as Minister of the Navy in three previously consecutive cabinets: Hayashi, Konoe, 
and Hiranuma.  Pressure to join the Axis (which was composed of Nazi Germany and Fascist 
Italy) sharply increased when news of the fall of France reached Tokyo on 22 June 1940.  
Realizing that Prime Minister Yonai would not budge in his opposition towards joining the Axis, 
Minister of War Hata prepared to sacrifice himself for the cause of joining the Axis and 
orchestrated a dispute with Prime Minister Yonai which resulted in his own resignation from the 
cabinet.
109
  Unable to find a replacement for Hata, Prime Minister Yonai submitted his 
resignation to the jūshin on 22 July 1940.  After accepting the resignation of Yonai, the jūshin 
decided to nominate Prince Konoe to the position of prime minister for a second time later that 
same day. 
 Shortly after resigning from the position of prime minister in 1939, Prince Konoe had 
organized several meetings with numerous bureaucrats and intellectuals.  What eventually 
resulted from these meetings was the creation of a new group that became known as the Shōwa 
Kenkyūkai (or Shōwa Research Association).  At the outset of 1940, Prince Konoe announced 
that the purpose of the group was to create a new political party.  One of the association’s self-
proclaimed Fascists, Rōyama Masamichi had written that he hoped that the new political party 
would be able to “achieve internal unity similar to the Nazis.”
110
  While there was extremely 
high optimism for a new political party that would be led by Prince Konoe, opposition to the 
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political party that the Shōwa Research Association was planning to create arose from a wide 
spectrum when it became known just how much influence the political party would have over 
every facet of Japanese economics, politics and society.  The most stalwart in their opposition to 
the new political party was the conservatives, making the claim that the party blasphemed the 
concept of kokutai.  Ex-Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichirō even made the assertion that the 
Shōwa Research Association was attempting to create a “new shogunate.”
111
  Faced with such 
criticism, Prince Konoe had the Shōwa Research Association reconsider the purpose of the 
political party.  After holding several meetings throughout the summer of 1940, the association 
decided that the ultimate goal of the political party was to strengthen national unity and end 
partisanship in the Imperial Diet. 
 In anticipation of the eventual creation of the new political party, the Seiyūkai voluntarily 
dissolved itself on 30 July 1940.  The Minseitō followed suit on 15 August 1940.  The 
dissolution of the two mainstream opposition political parties ensured that the new political party 
would have complete control over the lower House of Representatives.  On 12 October 1940, 
Prince Konoe and the other members of the Shōwa Research Association approved the formal 
establishment of the Tasei Yokusankei (or Imperial Rule Assistance Association).
112
  Upon 
announcing the establishment of the I.R.A.A., Prince Konoe made the following address to the 
Japanese people via radio: 
What the new structure aims at is the perfection of a political system founded on 
the principle of the unity of sovereign and subject, under which the will and ideas 
of those who govern will be made known to those who are governed for the 
guidance of the latter; and the will and ideas of those who are governed will be 
communicated to those who govern.  In other words, the function of government 
is to see that the people are enabled to find each his proper place; the duty of the 
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subject is to devotedly serve the throne.  This constitutes the essence of our 
national polity, which predicates loyalty as a supreme virtue existing between 
sovereign and subjects. . . .
113
 
With this, it can be seen that the original political party that the Shōwa Research Association had 
planned to create had been drastically changed during the final months of the groups meetings.  
It had been replaced by a political party that was to support, not supersede the current and 
existing structures that comprised of Japan. 
 A brief examination of Japanese society in the 1930s will show that there was no need for 
a new mass political party like the one that the Shōwa Research Association had been planning 
to create, since Japanese society was already adhering to several of the same aspects that had 
been major components within other fascist states found in Europe.  This change in Japanese 
society was being undertaken because there was a widespread belief among ultranationalists that 
uncontrolled Westernization was deteriorating the very heart and soul of Japan.
114
  Because of 
this belief, ultranationalists began to persuade government officials to implement necessary 
changes that they felt would improve Japanese society.  On 1 January 1936, the government 
launched the Dōmei News Agency; a news company largely responsible for circulating 
government controlled printed newspaper.  The government also attempted to control the usage 
of household radios by limiting ownership to one, and stressing the need to listen to public 
radios, with which the government controlled the content.
115
  The greatest example of the 
government imposing change on Japanese society occurred in March of 1937, when the Ministry 
of Education published the work Kokutai no Hongi or “Fundamentals of Our National Polity.” 
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 As mentioned in chapter 3, Kokutai no Hongi provided the ideological basis for many 
ultranationalists and their societies.  The text of Kokutai no Hongi stressed upon certain aspects 
that the Ministry of Education thought were important, aspects which were necessary for 
allowing Japan to return to its : 
Loyalty means to revere the emperor as [our] pivot and to follow him implicitly.  
By implicit obedience is meant casting ourselves aside and serving the emperor 
intently.  To walk this Way of loyalty is the sole Way in which we subjects may 
“live” and the fountainhead of all energy. . . . In our country, filial piety is a Way 
of the highest importance.  Filial piety originates with one’s family as its basis 
and, in its larger sense, has the nation as its foundation.  The direct object of filial 
piety is one’s parents, but in its relationship with the emperor finds a place within 
loyalty.
116
 
From this, it can be seen that the authors of Kokutai no Hongi clearly felt that there were certain 
aspects lacking within the mindset of the Japanese people.  In order to improve the state and the 
people, Kokutai no Hongi stressed upon the need of every Japanese subject to be steadfast in his 
loyalty and obedience to the Emperor.  In addition to this, the Confucian concept of filial piety 
was touched upon in order to improve the family structure, which was an important social unit in 
Japanese society.  Despite all of this, the importance of the Emperor and his role as the supreme 
authority throughout the country remained a key cornerstone of the concept of kokutai.  This 
text, along with other attempts made by the government in its push to control mass media clearly 
shows how much influence other fascist countries had on the Japanese. 
 On 22 July 1940, Prince Konoe accepted the nomination from the jūshin to become 
Japan’s new prime minister.  While Prince Konoe did his best to ensure that the home front was 
secure through the establishment of the I.R.A.A., his second tenure as prime minister was to be 
dominated by foreign affairs.  When forming his cabinet, Prince Konoe decided to rely on 
Matsuoka Yōsuke as Minister of Foreign Affairs.  Matsuoka was the Japanese ambassador who 
                                                          
116Cited in Sources of Japanese Tradition, 969 – 970. 
77 
 
led Japan out of the League of Nations in 1933.  On 27 September 1940, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Matsuoka approved the signing of the Tripartite Pact.  As with its predecessor the Anti-
Comintern Pact of 1936, the Tripartite Pact was an alliance of Japan, Germany and Italy that 
guaranteed cooperation between all signatories should the Soviet Union launch an attack against 
any of the countries that were involved with the pact. 
 Factionalism, as it had occurred during the early 1930s, became a major problem within 
the ranks of the Imperial Japanese Army in the early 1940s.  This time however, the dispute was 
over strategy, not policy.  Two schools of thought presented themselves to army commanders.  
The first strategy was known as “Strike North” and would force Japan into a war against the 
Soviet Union.  The second strategy was known as “Strike South” and proposed that both the 
Imperial Japanese Army and Navy work together to end the “ABD” (American, British and 
Dutch) encirclement of the Japanese home islands by seizing the Pacific islands that made up 
their colonial empires in the Pacific.  Ever mindful of the ongoing war with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Guomindang on the Asian mainland, military leaders saw great potential in the “Strike South” 
strategy in that it would enable the military to cut Chiang from receiving critical Western aid, 
and also provide Japan with new territories with which it could exploit for the war effort.  
Having embraced the “Strike South” strategy for its potential, the Imperial Japanese Army and 
Navy seized control of the French colony of Indochina in September of 1940. 
 Following the seizure of French Indochina in September of 1940, the Imperial Japanese 
Army and Navy began making preparations for further conquests in the South Pacific for the 
following year.  As a sign of protest to Japanese aggression in the region, the United States 
initiated economic sanctions which prevented Japan from purchasing iron and oil.  This severely 
strained the Japanese wartime economy.  In order to ease the economic stranglehold, Emperor 
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Shōwa ordered Prince Konoe, who was still acting as prime minister, to find a diplomatic 
solution to the rising tension between the Japan and the United States.  Unable to curb the 
military’s hawkish stance towards the United States or devise a diplomatic solution to the 
economic sanctions, Prince Konoe decided to submit his resignation to the jūshin on 18 October 
1941.  Before departing from the position of prime minister, Prince Konoe suggested to the 
jūshin that they nominate his own Minister of War Hideki Tōjō (1884 – 1948) as his 
replacement.  The jūshin agreed to do so, and on the same day that Prince Konoe submitted his 
resignation, the jūshin nominated the fiery General Hideki Tōjō to the position of prime minister.  
After accepting the nomination to become Japan’s new prime minister, General Hideki approved 
the full implementation of the “Strike South” strategy, which resulted in the Japanese conquest 
of all of the colonial territories of Great Britain and the Netherlands in the south Pacific.  The 
stage was thus set for an eventual conflict between Japan and the United States.  While the 
Japanese may have felt secure as a result of the internal transformation that had taken place 
during the 1930s, it was about to face yet another enemy in a war that it could not hope to win. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 While the establishment of the Meiji political structure by Itō Hirobumi was a resounding 
success, the one item that was severely lacking in the new political structure was a sense of 
nationalism.  The Genrō compensated for this by developing the concept of kokutai (or national 
polity) in the 1890s.  A series of conflicts, the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894 – 95, the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904 – 05, and the First World War, all contributed to the development of 
Japanese nationalism as well as an imperialist mentality.  By the 1930s, many Japanese had 
succumbed to the allurement of ultra-nationalism, none more so than those that occupied 
positions within the Imperial Japanese military.  The continuing development of nationalism, 
along with a growing sense of imperialism, led Japan to adopt an aggressive foreign policy 
towards the Asian mainland, eventually resulting in the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937 – 45.  
The issue of whether or not historians should label Japan a fascist state during the early Shōwa 
period has been discussed by many historians, and nearly every one of them has tried to come up 
with a reason to either abandon or keep the label.  The purpose of this thesis was to utilize a 
basic concept of fascism and to show how it could still be applied to Japan during the early 
Shōwa period.  However, if the fascist label is inappropriate to use as some historians suggest, 
then perhaps a new political label is required all together. 
 “At first glance the course of Japanese history in the 1930s differs so radically from that 
of the decade before that it presumes a profound discontinuity.  Terms like ‘military takeover’ or 
‘fascism’ have been employed to complicate interpretation and understanding.”
117
  That was 
historian Marius B. Jansen, introducing the reader to the 1930s in his The Making of Modern 
Japan.  After acknowledging the issue, Jansen does not investigate into it any further, and 
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refrains from using the fascist label for Japan during the time period and throughout his work.  In 
his Japan: A Modern History, historian James L. McClain wrote: “Yet, in the end, Japan never 
did experience an epoch of fascism.  There were Japanese who considered themselves fascists, 
just as there were individuals such as Rōyama Masamichi who were attracted by fascist 
ideology.”  Unlike Jansen, McClain clearly stated his position on the issue of whether or not 
Japan should be labeled as a fascist state during the early Shōwa period, and disagrees with its 
continued usage.  Despite all of this, McClain does not offer any alternatives with which to 
replace the fascist label. 
 In his Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation, 1868 – 2000, historian 
Richard Sims has much to say in regards to the issue of fascism and its role in Japan during the 
early Shōwa period.  Sims wrote: “In the late 1930s, moreover, the attraction of what has 
sometimes been called ‘military fascism’ drew some support away from the other wings of the 
nationalist movement and even from the socialist Shakai Taishuto.”
118
  After discussing the 
events which transpired during the Two Twenty-six Incident, Sims would go on to write: 
In a classic analysis Maruyama Masao maintained that the incident resulted in the 
defeat of ‘fascism from below.’  Whereas he regarded this as paving the way for 
‘fascism from above’, though, others have seen it as ushering in a ‘conservative 
reaffirmation.’  Both these views now seem oversimplified.  Even if it is accepted 
that Japan experienced fascism – a view which most Western scholars and a 
growing number of Japanese would not endorse – it must be noted that the young 
officers saw themselves as radical Japanists, not fascists.
119
 
By claiming that the rebels of the Two Twenty-six Incident were nothing more than radical 
Japanists, Sims is simply claiming that the rebels were nothing more than another branch of the 
ultranationalist movement.  Historian Michael Montgomery, who wrote Imperialist Japan: The 
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Yen to Dominate, does not mention fascism, or the issue of labeling Japan a fascist state at all 
throughout his work.  Per the title of his book, perhaps Montgomery believes that Japan was 
nothing more than another imperialist nation that harbored strong nationalist sentiments. 
 In the beginning of their article “Fascism and the History of Pre-War Japan: The Failure 
of a Concept,” historians Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto introduced the reader to the topic of 
their article by writing: 
Old paradigms never die; they just fade away, though often not soon enough.  
Historians and political scientists have managed to abandon a number of 
misleading descriptive or analytical concepts they had once used in talking about 
pre-war Japanese politics ― ‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy,’ for example.  But the 
metaphor of fascism persists, which is surprising, given the conceptual and 
empirical difficulties involved.
120
 
After introducing the issue of labeling Japan a fascist state during the early Shōwa period, Duus 
and Okimoto go on to write: “Or better yet, perhaps we should abandon the paradigm of fascism 
as one that has served its purpose but is no longer particularly useful.  The application of the 
concept to Japan in the 1930s has certainly helped us to ask better questions, but it is doubtful 
that it can help build any better models or suggest any new lines of inquiry.”
121
  The bulk of Duss 
and Okimoto’s article is primarily concerned with the ruling elite and how that elite utilized its 
power to give the government the right to intervene within Japanese economics and society.  
Duus and Okimoto eventually discussed the paradigm of “corporatism.”  According to the two 
historians, corporatism “encompasses a wide array of approaches, but which emphasizes the 
vigorous role played by the state as the dominant actor in the political system.”
122
  In the final 
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analysis of their article, Duus and Okimoto argue that the ruling elite allowed the government to 
intervene in the economy with the hopes that the government would be better able to manage 
both big business and scarce resources for the ongoing war in China.  The two historians 
eventually come to the conclusion that Japan during the early Shōwa period was nothing more 
than a state that featured strict managerial policies, and that the time to move on from the fascist 
label is now. 
 In his “A New Look at the Problem of ‘Japanese Fascism,’” historian George M. Wilson 
also argued against the continued use of the fascist label.  Rather than begin his article with the 
definitional problems of fascism as Duus and Okimoto had done with theirs, Wilson introduces 
the reader to the issue of labeling Japan a fascist state during the early Shōwa period by using 
Soviet scholarship.  Combined with Marxist ideology, Soviet scholarship adds a whole new style 
to the discussion for as Soviet scholar I. A. Latyshev had written: 
The specific character of the . . . fascist regime in Japan lay in that absolute 
monarchy was its form, while the leaders of the Japanese military came forward 
in the role of fascist dictators [and were] the most ardent servants of the zaibatsu 
and landlords, the cruelest butchers of the Japanese people.  Therefore, in order to 
set off and underline the specific character of the fascist dictatorship in Japan, [we 
may] call it monarcho-fascist dictatorship, or military-fascist dictatorship.
123
 
The second item that Wilson touches upon within his article is known as the “authoritarian-
modernization thesis.” Wilson writes: “Is it not proper, this argument asks, to label as fascist all 
those governments which in the process of rapid and paternal industrialization, encounter 
domestic and foreign crises that lead them to pursue policies of repression at home and 
aggressive expansion abroad?”
124
  The “authoritarian-modernization thesis” may seem to be an 
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ideal definition of fascism, it is incomplete however, for it lacks two important components of 
fascist ideology: (1) ultra-nationalism and (2) a cult of personality.  In the final analysis of his 
article, Wilson stated that one should continue the study of the issue primarily through 
comparative studies, and attributes the failure of fascism as a revolutionary political movement 
to the strength of the ruling elite that had been established since Meiji times. 
 As with the other two journal articles already mentioned, Miles Fletchers’ “Intellectuals 
and Fascism in Early Shōwa Japan,” examines the issue of labeling Japan a fascist state during 
the early Shōwa period.  Unlike the other two journal articles however, Fletcher favors keeping 
the fascist label.  Following his argument for the continued use of the fascist label, Fletcher goes 
into some of the Japanese scholarship that deals with the issue of labeling Japan a fascist state.  
After briefly examining the work of several Japanese academics, Fletcher wrote: 
The analyses of fascism by Maruyama, Tōyama, and Ōuchi reveal just how 
difficult it is to apply the concept of fascism to pre-war Japan at the level of 
political institutions.  Because the regime was oppressive, all three scholars agree 
that Japan was fascist.  But they admit that what they call Japanese fascism bore 
little resemblance to the rise of the Fascist Party in Italy, or the Nazi Party in 
Germany.  Indeed, in order to make the label of fascism fit, they have to argue 
that the Japanese pattern constituted a special case.
125
 
After this cursory mention of Japanese scholarship, Fletcher devotes the rest of his article to the 
Shōwa Kenkyūkai (or Shōwa Research Association) and a trio of intellectuals.  These three 
intellectuals were Rōyama Masamichi, Ryū Shintarō, and Miki Kiyoshi.  All three of these 
intellectuals conducted research in the areas of economics, and politics and developed ideas for 
the Shōwa Research Association which they thought, if applied to Japan, would vastly improve 
the stature of the nation.  Fletcher had written that: 
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Rōyama and other members of the Shōwa Research Association were convinced, 
however, that a new domestic order was necessary to strengthen Japan 
economically, and politically before an Asian regional bloc could be fashioned.  
During 1939 and 1940, the Association drafted plans for economic and political 
reform that drew heavily upon the ideas of Miki, Ryū, and Rōyama.  The plans 
were issued as pamphlets and circulated publicly.
126
 
In order to enact these reforms, the Shōwa Research Association was prepared to utilize the 
immense prestige of its founder Prince Konoe, who was due to become the new prime minister 
in the fall of 1940.  Once Prince Konoe became prime minister however, support for the plans 
that the Shōwa Research Association had drafted and were preparing to enact quickly fell apart 
in the face of conservative opposition.  Fletcher wrote: “The complete defeat of the New Order 
Movement as it was planned by the Shōwa Research Association revealed the great political 
power held by conservative elements of Japan’s modern elite.”
 127
  In his final analysis, Fletcher 
attributed the failure of fascism as a political movement in Japan to the Shōwa Research 
Association and its inability to enact any of its economic or political reforms. 
 The similarities and differences between Japan and other fascist nations are indeed many.  
And when examining a complex issue such as the one that this thesis is attempting, it sometimes 
helps to approach through the use of comparative studies.  Before arguing his case against the 
continued use of the fascist label, McClain had used a comparative approach when he introduced 
the issue to the reader: 
[Yoshino Sakuzō’s] comments serve as a reminder that Japan had historical 
commonalities with Germany and Italy: All three countries began to develop 
capitalist economies at a relatively late date; in each, democracy enjoyed only a 
brief and uneasy ascendancy as it fought to put down roots even while those 
countries struggled to overcome severe economic crises; and all three feared that 
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the British or Americans would stymie their aspirations for empire, so necessary 
for economic self-sufficiency.
128
 
After writing this, McClain then stated his position against the continued use of the fascist label, 
as mentioned above.  When writing about Prince Konoe and the beginning of his second tenure 
as prime minister, Sims also utilized a comparative approach in his work, and wrote: “The label 
‘fascist’ has been applied rather sweepingly by Japanese historians writing on the pre-war period, 
but in this particular case it is impossible to ignore the similarities between some of the 
advocates of a new order and the followers of Hitler and Mussolini.”
129
  According to historian 
George M. Wilson, Japanese Marxist scholar Tanaka Sōgorō had written that Japan was similar 
to Italy and Germany in that all were: “middle countries, strong enough to be able to undertake 
fascism’s basic actions – internal repression and external aggression – but not great powers.”
130
  
When Tanaka’s definition is coupled with the components of ultra-nationalism and a cult of a 
supreme leader, one can easily see how the fascist label can still be applied to Japan. 
 Many historians have suggested that the differences between Japan and other fascist 
nations outweigh the similarities.  In the beginning of their article, Duus and Okimoto write that 
Japanese historian Maruyama Masao “points out that in Japan there was no mass movement and 
no cult of the supreme leader, but a heavy stress on agrarianism, a central role for military 
officers, and so forth.”
131
  Later within his article, Wilson also pointed out that “There were in 
Japan no parallels for the Nazi and Fascist parties, their party armies, and their heroic “leaders”, 
the Führer and Duce.  Japanese government operated as before under the control of the same 
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elites, chosen largely among Tokyo Imperial University graduates, and in the military. . . .”
132
  
Even Miles Fletcher, who favored keeping the fascist label, wrote that “there were no similarities 
between the institutions of Nazi Germany and those of early Shōwa Japan.  No single mass party 
in Japan served as an analogue to the National Socialist Party in Germany, no dictator seized 
power, and no one ideology became dominant.”
133
  While it is certainly true that the I.R.A.A. 
was not as successful as the Nazi or fascist parties in retaining its power, to completely disregard 
it as an un-important movement within Japanese society would be wrong, for it was still heavily 
involved in massing support for the war in China.  The other major difference is largely 
concerned with the manner in which fascism arose in each country.  In both Germany and Italy, 
fascism came as a result of the political party leaders obtaining power through election or 
nomination, whereas in Japan, the Shōwa Research Association had attempted to impose fascism 
by using the prestige and leadership of its top ranking member, Prince Konoe. 
 Through its various articles, the Meiji Constitution was designed to protect imperial 
sovereignty.  This was achieved by limiting the powers and responsibilities of the lower House 
of Representatives.  Despite this, political partisanship became endemic during the early years of 
the Meiji political systems operation.  That partisanship existed between the opposition political 
parties, and the ruling Sat-chō Clique.  Four years after its initial startup, the Meiji political 
structure was still locked in a bitter battle between these two groups.  The environment within 
which the Meiji political structure found itself greatly changed with the outbreak of the First 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894 – 95.  Strong nationalist sentiment within the lower House of 
Representatives compelled the opposition political parties to cooperate with the ruling Sat-chō 
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Clique, and the opposition political parties allowed the passing of a large wartime budget.  Once 
the war was concluded, however, partisanship returned to end the cordial relationship that had 
existed between the Sat-chō Clique and the political parties. 
 In order to put an end to the partisanship, Genrō Itō Hirobumi, the architect of the Meiji 
political structure, and a leading member of the Sat-chō Clique, decided to break from the ruling 
elite’s policy of transcendentalism and created his own political party.  That party was officially 
established on 15 September 1900, and was known as the Rikken Seiyūkai.  Unlike the original 
opposition parties, the Rikken Seiyūkai was not a part of the populist Jiyū Minken Undō, but it 
could overcome any obstacle presented to it by its enemies by relying on the immense prestige of 
its founder, Genrō Itō.  Historians Peter Duus and R. P. G. Steven attribute the creation of a 
successful political party to the leadership of that political party and whether or not it was a part 
of the ruling elite.  Thirteen years later, on 23 December 1913, Katsura Tarō, a former general in 
the Imperial Japanese Army, decided to create the Rikken Dōshikai.  The eventual establishment 
of two new mainstream political parties by members of the ruling Sat-chō Clique demonstrated 
just how important it was to have a loyal bloc within the lower House of Representatives despite 
its weakened powers. 
 Unlike Genrō Itō, who wanted to take part in the political structure that he had created 
and ensure its success, Genrō Yamagata Aritomo was reluctant to allow the lower House of 
Representatives the ability to have even a minute impact on important matters of state.  The 
partisanship which gripped the lower House of Representatives during the first years of its 
operation had a profound impact on Genrō Yamagata, which led to feelings of deep mistrust 
towards the legislative body.  Widely recognized as the father of the Imperial Japanese Army, 
Genrō Yamagata was also one of the staunchest defenders of the state that Genrō Itō had created.  
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While he served as prime minister for a second time from 1898 – 1900, Genrō Yamagata had 
two imperial ordinances passed.  The first imperial ordinance was known as the Peace Police 
Law of 1900, and like its predecessor the Peace Preservation Law of 1887, it dealt with political 
dissent and unrest.  The second imperial ordinance that was passed involved the position of 
Minister of the Army / Navy, and restricted those positions to active duty Generals / Admirals.  
Both of these ordinances had a profound impact on Japanese history, in that the Peace 
Preservation Law oppressed any activity that seemed to threaten the livelihood of the state, and 
the military requirements for the positions of Minister of the Army / Navy ensured the 
independence of those positions from civilian meddling. 
 Apart from ensuring that the political structure worked as stipulated by the Meiji 
Constitution, one of the most grueling tasks that the genrō had to perform involved finding 
potential nominees for the position of prime minister.  After the death of Matsukata Masayoshi in 
1924, that responsibility lay solely with Prince Saionji.  Some may criticize Prince Saionji and 
the manner in how he chose men for the position of prime minister, but one must remember that 
not every candidate was ideal, and the decision to choose a man for the position was a daunting 
as well as exhausting task.  Despite having been president of the Seiyūkai and a long-time 
standing member of the party, Prince Saionji had no qualms of appointing military personnel or 
rival political party members to the position of prime minister.  As a genrō, the first duty of 
Prince Saionji was to find men who he felt could lead the country.  If his fellow Seiyūkai 
members were not up for the challenge, then he looked elsewhere for leadership.  To the 
detriment of constitutionalism in pre-war Japan, this was often found in the Imperial Japanese 
Army and Navy. 
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 It was during the early reign of Emperor Shōwa when great changes began to occur that 
would eventually affect not only Japan itself, but of every Japanese living within it.  The 
assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi on 15 May 1932, and the Manchurian Incident 
of 1931, are often seen as the starting points to when the military began to assert itself on the 
Meiji political structure.  It was also during this time, that ultra-nationalism and many of the 
societies that espoused it became active.  The importance that many ultranationalists and regular 
Japanese placed upon the concept of kokutai enables one to claim this as Japan’s “cult of the 
supreme leader.”  The idolization and worship that Emperor Shōwa received from his subjects 
can certainly be construed as such.  Despite this, Emperor Shōwa only assumed a leadership role 
once throughout his reign, and that was when the Two Twenty-six Incident had incapacitated the 
cabinet.  Once the incident had been concluded, Emperor Shōwa relinquished his powers back to 
the cabinet. 
 Those historians who condemn the continued use of the fascist label and offer no 
substantial replacements should be ashamed of themselves.  If one cannot label Japan a fascist 
state through its internal political institutions as some historians suggest, then one must look 
towards policies at the international and national level.  Labels such as authoritarian or military 
dictatorship should be disregarded for being too generic.  The idea that Japan was nothing more 
than another nation-state with strict managerial policies as proposed by Duus and Okimoto 
should also be discounted since it fails to acknowledge the importance of internal oppression and 
foreign aggression.  While it is true that Japan did not possess a dictator, or a single party-state as 
the model existed in Germany and Italy, it nonetheless acquired other components of fascist 
ideology.  These other components were integral parts of fascist ideology and included ultra-
nationalism, an aggressive foreign policy, and internal oppression.  Those components alone 
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should enable historians to continue applying and using the fascist label to early Shōwa Japan.  
In order to make matters easier, perhaps historians should follow in the footsteps of Michael 
Montgomery and adopt the imperialist label for Japan for the entire pre-war period.  For as Miles 
Fletcher had pointed out, the Shōwa Research Association was unable to enact any of its 
economic or political reforms due to opposition from conservative forces within the ruling elite, 
and no significant changes had occurred within Japan’s political structure.  Due to the strength of 
the similarities within the areas of domestic and foreign policy between Japan and other fascist 
nations, the fascist label can and should still be applied to describe early Shōwa Japan. 
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